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THE ADAM WALSH ACT'S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE: A DEFENSE OF CONGRESS'S POWER TO
CHECK THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF
UNREGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS
MATTHEW S. MINER*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (the Adam WalshAct or the Act) has been under relentless attack since it was enacted
in 2006.1 Litigants and academics have faulted the Act's civil commitment
provisions for unreformed sex offenders, resulting in a case before the
Supreme Court last term.2 Defendants have attacked the various penalty
provisions in the Act under the Eighth Amendment.3 The Act's Sex Of-
fender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) provisions have also
been challenged, including an ex post facto challenge that made its way to
the Supreme Court this year.4 In addition to these challenges, another
prominent legal claim often raised against the Act's registry provisions is
that Congress lacked the power to create such a law under the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses of the Constitution.
* Republican Staff Director, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. B.A.,
University of Cincinnati; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. In my previous
role as Chief Counsel for Crime and Terrorism to the Committee, I participated in
the weeks of staff negotiations regarding the final drafting of the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act. I would like to thank Hannibal Kemerer, William
Hall, Nick Rossi, Brian Benczkowski, Joe Matal, and the editorial staff of the
Villanova Law Review for their helpful comments and suggestions on this Article.
The views expressed in this Article are solely my own.
1. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587.
2. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (finding civil
commitment statute constitutional under Necessary and Proper Clause).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, No. 1:07-CR-196-BBM, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 104437, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 2, 2008), rev'd, 607 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2010) (finding that thirty-year mandatory sentence for aggravated sexual abuse
violated Eighth Amendment).
4. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).
(51)
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To date, a handful of courts5 and legal commentators6 have ques-
tioned the constitutionality of-specifically the Commerce Clause basis
for-SORNA's sex offender registration requirements and failure-to-regis-
ter penalty. Even though such views are against the great weight of federal
court authority,7 such arguments persist and are raised in case after case.
Numerous law review articles were published in the last year to advance
such views.8 Additionally, a group of law professors questioned SORNA
under the Commerce Clause in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court this
term. 9
At the core of these objections is a question about whether Congress
exceeded its power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause1 o when it
created a nationwide sex offender registry' and a federal penalty for sex
5. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2008), va-
cated, 584 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d
305 (N.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Hall, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 610 (N.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Mont. 2008); United States v. Powers, 544 F.
Supp. 2d 1331, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2008), rev'd, 562 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2009).
6. See Corey Raburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions,
46 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 369, 371-72 (2009); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 133, 134
(2008) [hereinafter Yung II]; Anne Marie Atkinson, Comment, The Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA): An Unconstitutional Infringement of States'
Rights Under the Commerce Clause, 3 CHARLESTON L. REv. 573 (2009); Robin Morse,
Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753, 1787 (2009).
7. See, e.g., United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d
254 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d
578 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010); United States v. Hinckley, 550
F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008).
8. See supra note 6.
9. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18-19
n.6, Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2009) (No. 08-1301), 2009 WL 4818499,
at *19 (arguing that Mann Act was incorrectly relied upon to justify SORNA under
Commerce Clause and asserting that disconnect in SORNA's criminal provisions
"between the interstate travel element and the failure to register element puts the
jurisdictional basis for SORNA in such cases on shaky ground").
10. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes").
11. Through SORNA, Congress created a nationwide sex offender registry
through provisions codified within title 42, chapter 151 of the United States Code.
For example, Congress required states to maintain a sex offender registry con-
forming to the registration requirements stated elsewhere in chapter 151. 42
U.S.C.A. § 16912(a) (West 2010). SORNA also required sex offenders to register
in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, works, or is enrolled as a student.
Id. § 16913. Specifically, the sex offender registration provision codified at Section
16913 provides:
(a) In general-A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration
current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the of-
fender is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial
52
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offenders who fail to register under the Act.12 Indeed, at the heart of
these objections is a question about the degree to which Congress actually
intended to regulate the interstate movement of sex offenders when it
passed the Act, rather than a broader intent to cause and enforce purely
intrastate registration requirements.13
These concerns are unfounded, as can be shown by the record before
Congress and the legislative debate that preceded passage of the Adam
registration purposes only, a sex offender shall also register in the juris-
diction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the juris-
diction of residence.
(b) Initial registration-The sex offender shall initially register-
(1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to
the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or
(2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that of-
fense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
(c) Keeping the registration current-A sex offender shall, not later
than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment,
or student status, appear in person in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pur-
suant to subsection (a) and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the
information required for that offender in the sex offender registry. That
jurisdiction shall immediately provide that information to all other juris-
dictions in which the offender is required to register.
(d) Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection
(b)-The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applica-
bility of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted
before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular
jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex
offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to
comply with subsection (b).
(e) State penalty for failure to comply-Each jurisdiction, other than a
Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall provide a criminal penalty that
includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year for
the failure of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this
subchapter.
Id.
12. SORNA codified a failure-to-register penalty at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a)
(West 2010). Section 2250(a) provides:
Whoever-
is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notifica-
tion Act;
(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act by reason of a conviction under Federal
law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or posses-
sion of the United States; or (B) travels in interstate or foreign
commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country; and know-
ingly fails to register or update a registration as required by the Sex Of-
fender Registration and Notification Act; shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 6, at 597 (arguing that SORNA failure-to-
register criminal penalty "punishes individuals for 'knowingly failing to register,'
not for interstate travel for the purpose of avoiding registration or for failing to
register, as the sex offender is in the act of traveling in interstate commerce").
53
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Walsh Act in 2006.'1 Although Congress did not issue a clear report sum-
marizing the legislative history behind the Act, the existing legislative re-
cord clearly shows that Congress was confronted by the very real
consequences of the unregistered movement of sex offenders.' 5
Throughout Congress's consideration and debate over the Adam Walsh
Act and related bills, members of Congress and hearing witnesses repeat-
edly cited the then-very recent tragic cases of sex offenders who relocated
or traveled across state lines to avoid detection.' 6 Oft-cited in this congres-
sional debate were North Dakota college student Dru Sjodin' 7 and the
family of Shasta and Dylan Groene,' 8 each of whom was victimized by a
sex offender who had been convicted, released, and registered in one
state, but committed heinous offenses in another state where his location
was unknown to law enforcement and the community. Members and
hearing witnesses' 9 also cited the tragic case ofJessica Lunsford, who was
kidnapped, abused, and murdered by a Florida sex offender who fled to
Georgia after committing his crimes. At the time of his arrest in Augusta,
Georgia, Jessica Lunsford's killer was on his way to buy a bus ticket to
Tennessee. 20
II. THE CASE OF AN INTERSTATE SEX OFFENDER AND His
INTERSTATE CRIME SPREE
The Groene case is a particularly strong example of the record before
Congress during negotiations and debate over the Adam Walsh Act in
2006. In addition to being cited throughout the debate over the Act, the
14. See infra Part IX.
15. For a further discussion of the legislative record, see infra Part IX.
16. For a further discussion of cases cited during the congressional debates
and hearings, see infra Part IX.
17. See 152 CONG. Rac. S8016-17 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Byron Dorgan) (citing kidnapping, rape, and murder of Dru Sjodin, Senator Dor-
gan's introduction of Dru's Law to improve sex offender registries, and his refer-
ence to Groene case sex offender, Joseph Duncan, at town hall meeting in North
Dakota before Groene case occurred and Duncan was found to have traveled cross-
country to offend again).
18. See 152 CONG. REc. S8019-20 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Maria Cantwell) (describing Groene case during Adam Walsh Act debate and ex-
plaining that that terrible episode "did not have to happen").
19. See Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Violent
Criminals: What Needs to be Done?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 109th
Cong. 6-8 (2005) (statement of Tracy Henke, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Office of
Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice) (citing cases of Jessica Lundsford and
Megan Kanka in explaining need for nationwide sex offender registry); id. at 15
(statement of Ernie Allen, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren) ("There are at least 100,000 non-compliant offenders; people like the killer
ofJessica Lunsford, who was not where he was supposed to be and whose presence
was unknown to the police orJessica's family even though he lived 150 yards down
the street from her and had worked construction at her elementary school.").
20. Jim Tunstall, Convict Sought in Jessie' Case Is Arrested, TAMPA BAY ONLINE,
Mar. 18, 2005, http://news.tbo.com/news/MGBWK9E2EAE.html.
54 [Vol. 56: p. 51
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disappearance of eight-year-old Shasta and nine-year-old Dylan Groene in
May 2005 sparked intense media attention and fixed the American pub-
lic's attention on the problem of recidivist child predators.
The Groene case starts with the disturbing history and travels of Jo-
seph E. Duncan, III, a repeat sex offender who committed sex crimes in
Washington, Minnesota, and Idaho, but was registered in only one state,
North Dakota. Duncan was first convicted in the State of Washington in
1980 of raping a fourteen-year-old boy at gunpoint.2 1 After a twenty-year
sentence, which included at least two stints on parole-both revoked-
and travel to four states, 22 Duncan moved to Fargo, North Dakota, where
he enrolled in computer science classes at North Dakota State
University. 23
Upon arriving in Fargo, Duncan reportedly registered as a Level III
sex offender in compliance with North Dakota law.2 4 Although Duncan's
time in Fargo appears to have been incident-free, in 2004 Duncan traveled
to Detroit Lakes, Minnesota, with a video camera in tow.25 He ap-
proached two small boys who were playing on a school playground, pulled
down one of the boys' pants, and fondled him.26 The boy was six years
old.2 7 Based on this incident, Duncan was again charged with a sex
crime-this time for child molestation.2 8
Despite his prior criminal history, Duncan appears to have been the
beneficiary of a gap in state information sharing when, on April 5, 2005,
Becker CountyJudge Thomas Schroeder set a $15,000 bail for Duncan. 29
According to later reports, Judge Schroeder was unaware at the time of
the bail hearing that Duncan was a Level III sex offender-the degree
regarded as most serious and most likely to reoffend.3 0 Duncan posted
bond with the help of a friend in Fargo and soon thereafter absconded.3 '
Within weeks, Duncan traveled to yet another state, Idaho, to begin a hor-
rific crime spree.
21. My Intent Is to Harm ... Then Die, SPOKESMAN REV., July 3, 2005, http://
www.spokesmanreview.com/sections/duncan/?ID= 7 8386.
22. Probation Records Reveal Duncan's Travels, SPOKESMAN REv., Aug. 4, 2005,
http://spokesmanreview.com/sections/duncan/?ID-83414.
23. My Intent is to Harm ... Then Die, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Minn. County Sued overJoseph Duncan's Release, ASsOcIATED PRESs, Dec.
5, 2005, http://wcco.com/topstories/Joseph.E.Duncan.2.353500.html.
26. My Intent is to Harm... Then Die, supra note 21.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Minn. County Sued over Joseph Duncan's Release, supra note 25.
30. Id.
31. Fargo Businessman Helped Idaho Suspect Make Bail, BISMARCK TRIB., July 12,
2005, http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/article_4173cb
3e-a297-5365-afbl-75ec3567f97a.html.
55
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On the night of May 16, 2005, after spotting Shasta and Dylan Groene
in bathing suits near their house, 32 and thereafter spying on the house for
a series of nights, 33 Duncan broke into their Wolf Lodge, Idaho home
with a sawed-off shotgun and tied up the children's mother, Brenda
Groene, and her fiance, Mark McKenzie. Duncan then beat the two adults
to death with a framing hammer and killed Shasta and Dylan's thirteen-
year-old brother Slade,34 who was last seen by Shasta staggering in a door-
way and collapsing with a fatal head wound. Duncan planned the burglary
and murders to kidnap Shasta and Dylan.35
What happened thereafter was even more horrific and tragic.
Duncan bound the children3 6 and took them to a primitive campsite in
Montana where he repeatedly abused them for weeks.37 After videotaping
his sexual abuse of Dylan, he murdered the nine-year-old boy by shooting
him twice.38 The first shot was in the abdomen; the second shot was to the
32. Nicholas K. Geranios, Trial to Open for Sex Offender in Family's Slayings, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 16, 2006, at A4 ("Police think it was the children in their
swimsuits that caught the attention of pedophile Joseph Edward Duncan III, trig-
gering a spree of savage slayings, kidnapping and child rape. The registered sex
offender, on the run from a child-molestation charge in Minnesota, drove past the
rural home where 8-year old Shasta Groene and her 9-year old brother, Dylan,
were frolicking in May 2005, investigators say."); The Case Against Joseph Duncan: A
Year in Review, SPOKESMAN REv. (Spokane, Wash.), May 13, 2006, at 6A ("Minutes
from court hearing reveal Duncan told Shasta Groene that he was driving past the
family's home, visible from Interstate 90, saw the girl playing in her swimsuit and
stalked the family for two or three days before the killings.").
33. See The Case Against Joseph Duncan: A Year in Review, supra note 32 (describ-
ing howJoseph Duncan broke into home and killed Shasta Groene's mother, step-
father, and brother, " [a] fter using night vision goggles to stalk a Wolf Lodge family
for up to three days").
34. See id. ("They are bludgeoned to death with a framing hammer.").
35. Betsy Z. Russell, Duncan: "I was on a Rampage", SPOKESMAN REv., Aug. 23,
2008, http://www.spokesmanreview.com/sections/duncan/?ID=258055.
36. Taryn Brodwater & Becky Kramer, Court Transcripts Detail Groene Case:
Court Documents Discuss Investigators' Search, Give Information on Groene, McKenzie
Deaths, SPOKESMAN REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Oct. 22, 2005, at IB (discussing how
Shasta Groene reportedly told authorities "she and Dylan were bound and gagged
and then placed in the truck. Shasta told detectives that she believed it was Mon-
tana where Duncan had taken her and her brother because he had shown it to her
on a map.").
37. Nicholas Geranios, Trial Nears One Year After Rescue, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), July 1, 2006, at B6 ("Found in Duncan's vehicle was a
digital video and computer equipment that Kootenai County prosecutor Bill Doug-
las said contain 'vile' images of what happened to the children at a primitive camp-
site in Montana.").
38. Patrick Orr, Duncan Doesn't Plead for His Life, IDAHO STATESMAN, Aug. 14,
2008, at 1 (describing prosecutor's closing arguments in death sentencing phase of
Duncan's trial, including how "Duncan [was] accused of taking Dylan to a remote
cabin away from the campsite, where he videotaped his rape of the boy" and how
"Duncan killed Dylan in front of his sister, first shooting the boy in the stomach.
[T]he prosecutor] Moss said that as the boy pleaded for his life, Duncan reloaded
the shotgun, put it against the boy's head and fired as his sister watched.").
56 [Vol. 56: p. 51
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boy's head.3 9 Duncan later lied to Shasta about the gunshot to Dylan's
stomach, claiming it was an accident "merely to win her compliance."4 0
What happened to Shasta has not been as extensively reported, most likely
out of respect for her status as a child victim and because she was the only
member of her family in the Wolf Lodge home to survive Duncan's
crimes.
Shasta's kidnapping and abuse ended nearly six weeks after it began.
In the early morning hours of July 2, 2005, a Denny's waitress in Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho recognized the little girl when she and Duncan entered
the restaurant.4 1 The waitress and others at the restaurant phoned au-
thorities, and Shasta was rescued that evening.4 2 Duncan later told au-
thorities that he was bringing Shasta to Coeur d'Alene to see her father.43
III. THE PUSH FOR COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRY LEGISLATION
The tragedy of the Groene case helped drive the congressional push
for a seamless national sex offender registry.4 4 When the Senate first
passed a bill containing a national sex offender registry in July 2005, then-
United States Senator Larry Craig cited the Groene case as justification for
the legislation: "While I grimace at the federal mandate to the states, the
interstate nature of these cases and the tragic results of any failures war-
rant it. I hope and pray this will prevent another tragedy like the Groene
case." 45 Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington, where Duncan was first
convicted, cited the Groene case in connection with her efforts to create a
federal failure-to-register penalty-something later included in the
SORNA provisions of the Adam Walsh Act. 46 In justifying the need for
federal legislation, she explained, "[t]here is a wide disparity among the
states . . . that is being exploited by sex offenders with tragic conse-
39. Id.
40. Russell, supra note 35.
41. See Geranios, supra note 37 ("Several [people at the restaurant] called
911, and waitress Amber Deahn stalled the two to give police time to respond.
After what seemed like an agonizing wait, three officers entered the restaurant,
arrested Duncan, and brightened the region's spirits with the miraculous
rescue.").
42. Id.
43. Taryn Brodwater, Duncan: 'It Had to End', SPoKESMAN REv., June 27, 2006,
http://www.spokesmanreview.com/sections/duncan/?ID=137498.
44. See The Case AgainstJoseph Duncan: A Year in Review, supra note 32 (listing
July 6, 2005, in timeline of events with caption stating: "Steve Groene urges the
public to lobby congressmen, senators, and 'even the president' to keep sexual
predators off the street.").
45. Betsy Z. Russell, Senate Calls for National Sex Offender Registry, SPoKEsMAN
REv. (July 29, 2005), http://www.spokesmanreview.com/sections/duncan/?ID=
82462.
46. Jim Camden, Cantwell Urges Consistent Sex Offender Laws: Senator Proposing
Stricter, Federal Legislation, SpoKEsMAN REv., Oct. 15, 2005, http://www.spokesman
review.com/sections/duncan/?ID=95984.
57
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quences."47 When a comprehensive sex offender registry bill-a precur-
sor to the Adam Walsh Act-passed the Senate in May 2006, Senator Mike
Crapo of Idaho again referenced the Groene tragedy: "More stringent na-
tional registration requirements for sex offenders, especially violent sex
offenders, will reduce the likelihood that the terrible events of last sum-
mer in North Idaho could ever be repeated .... ."48
In July 2006, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act was
finally enacted in response to the Groene case and many similar cases of
recidivist crimes by sex offenders. In signing the bill into law on July 27,
2006, President George W. Bush stated that the Act's SORNA provisions
"will help prevent sex offenders from evading detection by moving from
one state to the next."4 9
IV. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AND THE SEX OFFENDER NOTIFICATION
AND REGISTRATION ACT
In the Adam Walsh Act, Congress established, inter alia, a national sex
offender registry with unified standards and information sharing across
the patchwork of state and tribal registries, a registration requirement for
persons entering the United States, and federal criminal penalties for sex
offenders who travel in interstate or foreign commerce or "Indian coun-
try" and knowingly fail to register or update their registration. The Act
contains other provisions aimed at child exploitation prevention, includ-
ing new criminal penalties for enticement, civil commitment procedures
for unreformed sex offenders, and new Bail Reform Act provisions.
The SORNA provisions within the Adam Walsh Act built on the foun-
dation of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Vio-
lent Offender Act (the Wetterling Act) passed in 1994.5o In the
Wetterling Act, Congress required the United States Attorney General to
promulgate guidelines by which the States would establish sex offender
registries, including offender addresses, for certain offenders within their
jurisdictions.5 ' The Wetterling Act's mandate was tied to federal funding
insofar as states faced a ten percent cut in federal law enforcement fund-
ing if they failed to comply with the guidelines.52 The Wetterling Act did
not create a federal penalty for failure to register under state law, but re-
47. Id.
48. Betsy Z. Russell, Bill Makes Sex Offender Registration Mandatoy, SPOKESMAN
REv., May 9, 2006, http://www.spokesmanreview.com/sections/duncan/?ID=129
963.
49. Press Release, The White House, President Signs H.R. 4472, the Adam
Walsh Act Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-
6.html.
50. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Of-
fender Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XVII, §§ 170101-303, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038-45
(1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)-(b) (2006).
52. Id. § 14071 (g) (2).
58 [Vol. 56: p. 51
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lied upon individual states to enact their own failure-to-register
penalties.5 3
The Wetterling Act was later modified in response to the tragic case
of Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl who was lured into the
garage of a repeat sex offender who lived in her neighborhood, purport-
edly to see his new puppy. 54 She was thereafter raped and murdered, and
the offender, Jesse Timmendequas, dumped her body in a park.55
Megan's family was completely unaware of the sex offender's presence in
their neighborhood, and they were clear to say that, had they known, they
would never have allowed Megan to play outside without constant supervi-
sion.5 6 Megan's Law, passed in 1996, added a community notification re-
quirement to the Wetterling Act.5 7 Congress also modified the Wetterling
Act in 1996 to create a national sex offender tracking database via the Pam
Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act.5 8
Even against this history of legislation, the Adam Walsh Act represents
the most aggressive congressional action to address child crimes and sex
offender registration. The SORNA provisions go beyond the Wetterling
Act to create more detailed requirements for state sex offender registries,
as well as a national public registry that can be accessed via the Internet by
reference to zip code and geographic area. SORNA also creates a federal
failure-to-register penalty that makes it a felony offense for anyone to fail
to register under state law, where the person: (1) has previously been con-
victed of a federal offense; or (2) has traveled in interstate or foreign com-
merce and failed to register.5 9
V. WHY SORNA MATrERS: How SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES HELP
PREVENT AND SOLVE SEX CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN
Some commentators have suggested that federal failure-to-register
laws will not curb recidivism among sex offenders6 0 or will prevent only a
53. Id. § 14071(d).
54. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMs, U.S.
DEPT. OFJUsTIcE, Background Information on the Act and its Amendments, http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
55. William Glaberson, 'Megan' Trial Set to Begin Amid Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 1997, at B4, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40610
FF39540C768CDDAC0894DF494D81&scp=2&sq='Megan'%2Trial%2OSet%20to
%20Begin%2OAmid%2OScrutiny&st=cse.
56. See Background Information on the Act and its Amendments, supra note 54.
57. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, Overview and History of the Jacob Wetterling Act, http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2aljwacthistory.html.
58. See id.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
60. See Yung, supra note 6, at 371-72 (stating that "many scholars have ques-
tioned the efficacy of . .. [sex offender registry] laws in actually decreasing recidi-
vism by offenders").
59
9
Miner: The Adam Walsh Act's Sex Offender Registration and Notification R
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
60 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: p. 51
small number of sex crimes.6 1 These suggestions, however, misapprehend
the role and importance of sex offender registries in law enforcement, as
well as the gap-filling nature of both SORNA's registration requirements
and federal failure-to-register penalty.
A. The Role of Sex Offender Registries in the Prevention
and Solving of Sex Crimes
As noted above, when critics of SORNA's sex offender registry and
penalty provisions discuss the utility of these provisions, they often make
arguments that fail to capture the true value and intended benefit of a
seamless sex offender registry system. For example, one academic has
questioned the impact of registries by citing a study of recidivism and sug-
gesting that registries do not actually reduce recidivism. 62 But such an
argument ignores the fact that sex offender registries were not created as a
palliative remedy to help sex offenders behave better. Rather, the push
for sex offender registries and their improvement via SORNA was driven
by an acknowledgement that sex offenders will often commit further sex
crimes after their release.6 3 Indeed, the floor debate on the bill was punc-
tuated by references to repeat sex offenders and recidivism rates.6 4 Sim-
ply put, Congress created SORNA with the belief that communities and
law enforcement need to have information on sex offenders within their
communities precisely because they may reoffend. 65
61. See Morse, supra note 6, at 1787 (asserting that Adam Walsh Act's civil
commitment provision and "failure to register penalty would prevent only a small
number of federal sex crimes").
62. Yung, supra note 6, at 371 n.22.
63. See Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Violent
Criminals: What Needs to be Done?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109-31, at 9 (2005)
(written statement of Tracy Henke, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Office of Justice Pro-
grams, U.S. Dept. of Justice) (noting in written testimony in connection with sex
offender registry proposals "continued and new concerns about new crimes being
committed by sex offenders").
64. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REc. S8029 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter) ("Statistics show that sex offenders prey most often on juveniles;
that two-thirds of the sex offenders currently in State prisons are there because
they have victimized a child. Compared with other criminals, sex offenders are
four times more likely to be rearrested for a sex crime. It is estimated that some
500,000 children are sexually abused each year. According to Department of Jus-
tice statistics, child molesters have been known to re-offend as late as 20 years after
their release from prisons.").
65. See id.; see also Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Vio-
lent Criminals: What Needs to be Done?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 109-31, at 15 (statement of Ernie Allen, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for
Missing and Exploited Children) ("We need to do a better job of identifying those
who represent the greatest risk and those whose criminal histories should forfeit
any right to be on the streets and close to innocent children. But at a minimum,
we must know where all of these convicted sex offenders are, and what they're
doing.").
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The value of these registries and notification programs to citizens,
and in particular to parents, can best be explained by looking to cases
where parents and victims were unaware of the presence of sex offenders
in their area due to the lack of an effective registry or the relocation of an
unregistered sex offender. 66 For example, the parents of Megan Kanka-
the seven-year-old little girl who was raped and murdered by a twice-con-
victed sex offender-were outraged to learn that the offender, Jesse Tim-
mendequas, had been able to move into their neighborhood anonymously
without parents being able to take basic precautions.67 As Megan's
mother has said repeatedly since her daughter's death, "If we had known
there were three convicted pedophiles across the street, Megan would be
alive today."6 8
Registries also play a vital role-perhaps their most vital role-in sup-
porting law enforcement's efforts to solve child abductions and sex crimes
in the hours and days after a disappearance. The first hours after a child's
disappearance are critical. A Department of Justice publication explains
that "the actions of parents and of law enforcement in the first 48 hours
are critical to the safe recovery of a missing child."6 9 The critical time
period is likely much shorter. Three-quarters of children who are kid-
napped and later murdered are killed within the first three hours of their
abduction. 70 Time is literally a life-and-death matter in such cases.
66. See, e.g., David Hench, Victim: Sex Offense Law Has Holes, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Dec. 8, 2004, at Al ("Michelle Tardif believes she would have been more
careful as a girl had she known then that her Saco [Maine] neighbor was a sexually
violent predator. When Tardif was 10, Joseph J. Tellier snatched her off her bicy-
cle, drove her to a secluded spot in the woods, raped her and beat her to the brink
of death.").
67. See jurors Order Death Sentence for Megan Kanka's Killer (CNN television
broadcast June 20, 1997), available at http://www.cnn.com/US/9706/20/
kanka.verdict.pm/ ("The Kankas and their neighbors were outraged that they
were never informed that Timmendequas had two previous sex convictions when
he moved into the neighborhood. He was convicted in a 1981 attack on a 5-year-
old child and an attempted sexual assault on a 7-year-old.").
68. Gene Warner, When Tears Are Not Enough: Megan Kanka's Mother Shares the
Story of Her Daughter's Murder by a Pedophile, a Tragedy that Became a Crusade, BUFFALO
NEws, Feb. 7, 2002, at BI; see also Paula Zahn Now: Protecting Children from Sexual
Predators, 2005 WLNR 6253487 (Westlaw) (CNN television broadcast Apr. 21,
2005) (transcript on file with author) (containing interview with Maureen Kanka,
who said: "If we had known there were three sex offenders across the street, my
daughter would be alive and well today.").
69. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WHEN YOUR CHILD IS MISSING: A FAMILY SURVIVAL GUIDE (1998), available
at http://www.ojdp.ncjrs.gov/pubs/childismissing/chl.html.
70. See Press Release, Office ofJustice Programs, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Innova-
tions in Rescuing Abducted Children Highlighted at National Amber Alert Confer-
ence (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/press
releases/2007/ojdp07O62.htm (quoting Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. Cybele Daley's
statement that "[s]eventy-four percent of children who are kidnapped and later
found murdered are killed within the first three hours after being taken").
6)1
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The very short time period first responders have to save an abducted
child's life explains why law enforcement needs an accurate registry of
known sex offenders who live or work in the area where a child disap-
pears. 7' In the immediate aftermath of a child's disappearance, law en-
forcement often questions sex offenders located in close proximity to the
disappearance. Indeed, an investigative checklist produced joindy by the
Department ofJustice and the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children lists the following action step for first responders in missing chil-
dren cases: "Review sex-offender registries to determine if individuals des-
ignated as sexual predators live, work, or might otherwise be associated
with the area of the child's disappearance."12 This investigative step is, of
course, only helpful if the registry is reliable and comprehensive, as shown
by the tragic case of nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford, who was kidnapped
from her bedroom by a convicted sex offender in 2005 and thereafter
raped and murdered.7 3
In the Lunsford case, law enforcement took the usual precaution of
contacting sex offenders who were registered as living near Jessica's
home.74 This step should have led law enforcement to a nearby home-
within sight of the Lunsford home-where convicted sex offender John
Couey lived.75 But, Couey had not registered at that address.7 6 Accord-
71. LExISNEXIS WHITE PAPER, USING GROUNDBREAKING TECHNOLOGY TO EN-
HANCE LAw ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS To LOCATE SEX OFFENDERS, https://www.lexis
nexis.com/government/insights/whitepapers/SexOffenders.pdf ("Sex offenders
who do not continued to live at their registered addresses present an increasingly
daunting law enforcement problem. Recent cases of child abductions in Florida
and Idaho demonstrate that sex offenders who move without registering, particu-
larly across state lines, leave law enforcement officials without investigative leads,
especially during the all-important forty-eight hours after a child is abducted.").
72. OFFICE OFJUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, INVESTIGATIVE CHECK-
LIST FOR FIRST RESPONDERS (2006), available at http://www.missingkids.com/
enUS/publications/NC88.pdf.
73. Abbie Vansickle & Justin George, Wasjessica Lunsford a Captive for 3 Days?,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 27, 2005, at IB, available at http://www.sptimes.com/
2005/05/27/news-pf/Citrus/Wasjessica Lunsford_.shtml.
74. See e.g., Chris Hawke, Girl's Body Found Near Home, CBS NEWS, Mar. 19,
2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/19/national/main681752.shtml
(stating "detectives grew interested in Couey while interviewing all registered sex
offenders in the area. They tried to contact Couey at his home in Homasassa five
days afterJessica disappeared and discovered he no longer lived there"); see also
John Evander Couey: Sex Offender Living in Plain Sight, http://www.amw.com/fugi-
tives/capture.cfm?id=30871 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (America's Most Wanted
case file) ("Early in the investigation, deputies focused on known sex offenders
who were living near the Lunsford home. Couey was a registered offender, but his
registered address on Grover Cleveland Boulevard in Homosassa was miles away
from the Lunsford home on South Sonata Avenue, and authorities first focused on
offenders who lived closer.").
75. See Sex Offender Living in Plain Sight, supra note 74 ("As the search broad-
ened to include Couey, deputies discovered that he had left his registered address
without notifying authorities. His new address immediately raised suspicions-it
was on South Snowbird Terrace, within sight of the Lunsford home.").
76. Id.
62 [Vol. 56: p. 51
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ingly, the critical first steps taken by law enforcement in the hours after
Jessica disappeared missed the very sex offender who had abducted her
and the home where she was held captive, abused, and eventually
smothered to death in a plastic trash bag.7 7 Some reports suggest that
Jessica was alive for up to three days after her abduction before she was
killed.7 8 If true, a reliable sex offender registry might very well have saved
her young life.
B. SORNA's Registry Provision and the Federal Failure to Register Penalties
Were Necessary to Fill Gaps in, and Provide Greater Enforceability
to, the Existing State-by-State Registry System
By the time the Adam Walsh Act was under debate, it had become
clear that the state-by-state system of sex offender registries had gaps7 9 and
that tens of thousands of sex offenders had fallen or snuck through those
gaps in the system.80 These flaws in the system were brought home in
written testimony submitted to the House Judiciary Committee in June
2005:
[T]here are many problems in the state programs that thwart the
original Congressional intent in passing the [Wetterling] Act.
The federal scheme leaves a great deal of discretion to the states
in how they implement their individual registration programs.
As a result, there is a significant lack of consistency and uniform-
ity from state to state. There are also serious discrepancies
among the states, creating loopholes in the laws that permit sex
offenders to cross state lines and remain undetected. We know
that registered sex offenders often "forum-shop" in order to
achieve anonymity. Some examples of the discrepancies in the
state statutes are the following:
* in 8 states the offender alone has the burden to notify the
authorities in a new state when moving into that state.
77. See id. ("Couey told detectives he placed her inside a garbage bag and that
she lay down in the hole without a fight. The medical examiner listed the cause of
death as suffocation.").
78. See Vansickle & George, supra note 73 ("John Couey told investigators he
keptJessica Lunsford bound inside his bedroom closet for at least three days and
hid inside his bedroom when detectives came to his mobile home to ask about her,
according to documents released Thursday.").
79. See 109 CONG. REc. S8029 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Ar-
len Specter). Senator Spector stated, "There are currently State laws which require
registration of sex offenders, but unfortunately they have proved to be relatively
ineffective, which requires the Federal Government to act on the national level."
Id.
80. Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sex Offender Tracking
Strengthened by Adam Walsh Act, THE FRONT LINE, Winter 2007, at 4, available at
http://www.missingkids.com/en-US/publications/NC93.pdf ("Before the Adam
Walsh Act, many sex offenders took advantage of inconsistencies in state laws, mov-
ing to other states or simply slipping under the radar of law enforcement to evade
registration requirements.").
63
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* in 2 states neither the offender nor the state authorities are
required to notify authorities in a new state-in another 3
states this issue is not even addressed.
* in only 8 states an offender's probation or parole may be
revoked for failure to comply with registration duties.
* in 31 states the penalty for failure to comply with registra-
tion duties is only a misdemeanor.
* in 3 states offenders have more than 10 days to notify the
authorities when they change their address.81
At the same hearing, both members of Congress and witnesses discussed
the 100,000 sex offenders whose whereabouts were unknown due to flaws
in the system or offenders relocating without registering their new loca-
tions.8 2 By the time the Adam Walsh Act was nearing passage in the Sen-
ate one year later, the two lead Senate sponsors of the Act cited an even
larger number-150,000-of known, but unregistered sex offenders who
had fallen through gaps in the state-by-state registry system.8 3 In sum,
when Congress enacted the SORNA provisions of the Adam Walsh Act, it
was clear a federal solution was needed.8 4
81. Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals:
What Needs to be Done?: Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109-
31, at 17-18 (2005) (statement of Ernie Allen, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing
and Exploited Children).
82. See id. at 14 ("Mr. Chairman, you mentioned it in your opening remarks.
Today, there are 550,000 registered sex offenders in the United States, but at least
100,000 of those offenders are non-compliant.").
83. See 109 CONG. REc. S8013 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("There are
more than a half-million registered sex offenders in the United States. Those are
the ones we know. Undoubtedly there are more. That number is going to go up.
Over 100,000 of those sex offenders are registered but missing. That number is
going to go down. We are going to get tough on these people. Some estimate it is
as high as 150,000 sex offenders who are not complying. That is killing our chil-
dren."); 109 CONG. REc. S8014 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) ("The National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, as Senator Hatch has indicated, esti-
mates there are over 550,000 sex offenders nationwide, and more than 20 percent
of them are unaccounted for. I would argue that there are a whole lot more than
550,000, who never get caught up in the criminal web for a thousand different
reasons that I do not have time to explain. But at a minimum, this means there
are as many as 150,000 of these dangerous sex offenders out there, individuals who
have already committed crimes and may, unless we do something, continue to
jeopardize the most vulnerable among us.").
84. See Michael Gormley, Megan's Mother Launches Crusade; Seeks Federal Law to
Track Pedophiles, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 4, 2005, at A06 (quoting
Maureen Kanka, Megan's mother, in her advocacy for federal registry law: "Every
state has a different law and every state has a different variation. ... We can have a
tough, uniform law and the only way I think we can do that is to have a federal
law.").
64 [Vol. 56: p. 51
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss1/2
2011] THE ADAM WALSH Acr & THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
VI. A MINORITY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS HAVE QUESTIONED THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SORNA's REGISTRY AND PENALTIES
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In a series of now-reversed decisions, a number of federal district
courts in the past two years have held that Congress acted beyond its Com-
merce Clause powers under the United States Constitution when it en-
acted within the Adam Walsh Act a nationwide registry requirement and a
federal offense for unregistered sex offenders who travel in interstate or
foreign commerce.
In April 2008, United States District Judge Gregory A. Presnell of the
Middle District of Florida ruled that the Adam Walsh Act's SORNA regis-
tration requirements and the associated criminal penalties codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2250(a) "violate[ ] Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
and [are], therefore, unconstitutional."85 In so ruling, Judge Presnell dis-
missed the notion that the SORNA requirements or penalties deal "with
the regulation of channels or instrumentalities of commerce."8 6 He also
found that the court was not "dealing with the regulation of persons or
things in interstate commerce."87 In the conclusion of his opinion revers-
ing the conviction for failure to register, Judge Presnell wrote that "the
Adam Walsh Act was enacted with a commendable goal-to protect the
public from sex offenders. However a worthy cause is not enough to trans-
form a state concern (sex offender notification) into a federal crime."8 8
Not mentioned in that same conclusion was that the defendant, Robert
Powers, had lived in multiple states since his release from prison on a sex
offense conviction-but only registered as a sex offender in one, the state
from which he was released from prison.8 9 Despite the defendant's unre-
gistered relocation to and residence in Florida and his arrest in yet an-
other state, Washington,9 0 Judge Presnell ruled against the
constitutionality of the Act because "mere unrelated travel in interstate
commerce" is insufficient to create a Commerce Clause nexus with the
"purely local conduct" of failing to register.9 ' This analysis seems to com-
85. United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2008),
vacated and remanded, 562 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). At the same time Judge
Presnell ruled in favor of the defendant in Powers, he also ruled in favor of another
registry violation defendant named Tommy Williams Buckius. See Jim Leusner,
judge Frees Out-of-State Sex Offenders, OuANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 19, 2008, at B4 (dis-
cussing Judge Presnell's twin rulings in Powers and Buckius cases).
86. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
87. Id. at 1333-34.
88. Id. at 1336.
89. Cf id. at 1332 ("In compliance with South Carolina law, Mr. Powers regis-
tered as a sex offender on November 13, 1995. Mr. Powers moved to Florida in
2007 to live with his mother in Orlando. He failed to register as a sex offender in
Florida .... On December 4, 2007, Mr. Powers was arrested, while working in the
state of Washington, and charged with a violation of SORNA for failing to register
in Florida.").
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1336.
65
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pletely miss the underlying purpose of the Act's registry provisions, which
was to place some meaningful check on the unregistered and undetected
movement of sex offenders across jurisdictional lines.9 2
At the same time he ruled in favor of the defendant in Powers, Judge
Presnell also ruled against the constitutionality of SORNA in another case,
United States v. Buckius, on very similar grounds. The impact of Judge
Presnell's twin decisions in Powers and Buckius was short-lived. Within a
year, the Eleventh Circuit reversed both decisions, finding that Congress
acted within its Commerce Clause power in enacting SORNA.93
Judge Presnell was not, however, alone in his view of SORNA under
the Commerce Clause. In December 2008, a second federal district court
in Florida ruled against the constitutionality of the SORNA registration
and penalties. In United States v. Myers,94 Judge William Zloch granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with
state registration requirements while traveling in interstate commerce.9 5
In so ruling, Judge Zloch appeared to recognize that he was going out on
a limb, yet he nonetheless stated the crux of his decision in emphatic
terms:
Against the great weight of persuasive authority on this matter,
and for reasons other than those expressed in Powers and Wayb-
right, the Court finds that both § 16913 [the state registry provi-
sion] and § 2250 [the federal criminal penalty] exceed
Congress's grant of authority under the Commerce Clause....
Congress, however, has no power to regulate a person simply because at
some earlier time he has traveled in interstate commerce.96
Judge Zloch then proceeded to a detailed history of Federal Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, from the Supreme Court's 1824 ruling in Gibbons v.
Ogden through its 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich.97
The precise facts of defendant Myers' crime cannot be described be-
cause they were never discussed in the court's thirty-eight page discussion
of the Adam Walsh Act and the Commerce Clause. The omission of these
facts from the decision, however, squares with the ruling insofar as the
judge was evaluating a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
SORNA penalties. In sustaining that challenge, Judge Zloch found that
"the regulation is not aimed at the individual's travel, nor is it directed at
92. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.html.
93. United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2009).
94. 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2008), vacated and remanded, 584 F.3d 1349
(11th Cir. 2009).
95. Id. at 1316-17.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1318-27 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), and Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
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protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. . . . The regu-
lated activity, the failure to register, is completely local, non-economic ac-
tivity, similar to possession of a gun in a school zone and gender-motivated
violence."98
Acting on the authority of a prior decision, the Eleventh Circuit va-
cated Judge Zloch's dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for
further proceedings.99 That prior decision, United States v. Ambert, 0 0 af-
firmed yet another Florida federal district court ruling, this one upholding
the constitutionality of SORNA under the Commerce Clause.101
Rulings against SORNA have not been confined to Florida. A series
of similar rulings were issued by Judge David Hurd in a pair of cases before
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. 10 2
However, unlike the rulings in Powers and Meyers, Judge Hurd did not dis-
pute the adequacy of Section 2250's interstate travel requirement under
the Commerce Clause.
For example, in United States v. Hall, Judge Hurd dismissed the indict-
ment against David Hall, a sex offender who failed to register under New
York law and thereafter moved to Virginia. 103 Despite this broader ruling,
Judge Hurd rejected the defendant's claim that Section 2250's interstate
commerce element was insufficient "because it does not require the defen-
dant to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to violate the stat-
ute."104 Judge Hurd noted that the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lopez 0 5 made clear that "Congress may regulate 'persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, even though the threat may come from only intrastate
activities.' " 0 6 Based on the Lopez authority, he rejected the defendant's
challenge to the failure to register statute, reasoning that "Congress may
safeguard against conduct that is wholly intrastate so long as the federal
statute extends only to individuals who travel in interstate commerce." 0 7
Judge Hurd's ruling on the constitutionality of Section 2250 did not,
however, end his Commerce Clause analysis. After concluding that Sec-
tion 2250, writ large, is constitutional because it contains an interstate
98. Id. at 1338.
99. United States v. Myers, 584 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2009).
100. 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 1215 ("In short, we hold that Ambert is bound by the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act, and that §§ 16913 and 2250 of the statute are
constitutional both facially and as applied. Accordingly, we affirm.").
102. United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); United
States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Hall,
588 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). Each of these decisions was reversed in
a single, consolidated opinion. See United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
2010).
103. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
104. Id. at 619.
105. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
106. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
107. Id.
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commerce element, he proceeded to analyze the first element of the stat-
ute in isolation to determine if it could be justified on commerce grounds.
The first element under Section 2250 is failure to register under SORNA's
registration requirement, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16913. The de-
fendant in Hall had argued that "Congress lacks the constitutional author-
ity to require individuals convicted of state [and] local offenses to register
as sex offenders" and that this lack of federal legislative jurisdiction would
nullify any failure to register conviction "because the duty to register as a
sex offender pursuant to SORNA is a required element of the federal
criminal statute." 0 8 After analyzing Section 16913's registration require-
ment under both the Commerce Clause and Congress's spending power,
Judge Hurd concluded that "§ 16913 is not a valid exercise of Congres-
sional authority. . . . It then follows that a conviction under § 2250(a) is
invalid because the criminal penalty statute demands the Government
must prove defendant was required to register under § 16913."1oo
Shortly after the Hall decision, Judge Hurd confronted similar legal
questions in United States v. Guzman."r0 Like the defendant in Hall, the
convicted sex offender in Guzman moved out of state and failed to notify
the sex offender registry authorities in both New York and his new state of
residence."' Unlike in Hall, however, the government raised new argu-
ments in defense of the constitutionality of Section 16913's registration
requirements." 2 Among its new arguments, the government asserted that
Section 16913 was justified under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper
Clause as a necessary control on interstate movement of sex offenders and
an essential predicate to the failure-to-register penalty." 3 Judge Hurd re-
jected this argument, reasoning that Congress lacked the authority to cre-
ate a nationwide system of sex offender registration. In doing so, he cited
the narrower scope of the federal failure-to-register penalty to suggest that
the government was asserting an incoherent argument:
The Government's reasoning then begs the question: If, accord-
ing to the Government, Congress has the power to regulate the
intrastate activity of sex offenders, why does § 2250 only enforce
the registration requirements after a sex offender travels in inter-
state commerce? It is difficult to reconcile Congress's decision to
108. Id.
109. Id. at 622.
110. 582 F. Supp. 2d 305 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
111. Id. at 308.
112. Id. at 309.
113. See id. at 313 ("The Government asserts that the federal duty to register
under § 16913, regardless of whether a sex offender travels in interstate com-
merce, 'is a necessary step toward carrying out [SORNA's] goal.' The Government
argues that without a uniform registration requirement throughout the country,
sex offenders may more easily cross state lines undetected and the purpose of
SORNA may be defeated. The Government attempts to show that § 16913 is a
reasonably adapted regulation of intrastate activity because the overall regulatory
scheme of SORNA 'could be undercut' otherwise." (citation omitted)).
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forego a criminal penalty for the intrastate registration of sex of-
fenders with the Government's argument that Congress has the
power to regulate such activity and that the overall regulatory
scheme of SORNA could be undercut if not for the creation of a
national registration requirement.' 1 4
The Second Circuit disagreed with this reasoning and reversed Judge
Hurd's rulings in Hall and Guzman.' 1 5 The appellate court found that
Congress had adequate legislative jurisdiction to enact the federal failure-
to-register penalty under the Commerce Clause' 1 6 and Section 16913's re-
gistration requirements under the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 1 7
VII. A HANDFUL OF LAW REVIEW ARTICLES AND COMMENTATORS HAVE
ALso QUESTIONED THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BASIS FOR THE
FEDERAL SORNA REQUIREMENTS AND PENALTIES
In his 2009 article, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional
Questions,1 1 8 Professor Corey Rayburn Yung sets forth a thoughtful, yet
highly critical, analysis of the history behind sex offender notification laws
and the constitutionality of SORNA's registry and failure-to-register provi-
sions under each of the above-cited provisions of the Constitution.' 19 In
so doing, Professor Yung concludes that "SORNA has run roughshod over
the rights derived from" a variety of constitutional provisions, including
"the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause,
[and] the Commerce Clause." 120
With regard to SORNA and the Commerce Clause, Professor Yung
first discusses the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez,12 1
United States v. Morrison,]22 and Gonzales v. Raich,123 to set forth the frame-
work the Supreme Court has most recently used to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of federal statutes under the Commerce Clause. He then
examines SORNA against this framework, noting that "Congress made no
findings to show a connection between any SORNA provisions and inter-
state commerce," but also noting that SORNA's criminal penalty "includes
a jurisdictional limitation that requires the government to prove that a
defendant is a person who 'travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or
114. Id. at 314.
115. United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
116. See id. at 90 ("We have no difficulty concluding that § 2250(a) is a proper
congressional exercise of the commerce clause under Lopez.").
117. Id. at 91.
118. Yung, supra note 6.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 371.
121. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
122. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
123. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country."l 24 This latter point is a
major distinguishing feature from the federal statute at issue in Lopez,
which had no such jurisdictional element. In rejecting the Gun-Free
School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause, the Lopez Court was clear
to point out that the Gun-Free Act's prohibition on the possession of a
firearm within 1,000 feet of a school "contains no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm posses-
sion in question affects interstate commerce." 2 5 The Lopez Court con-
trasted the Gun-Free School Zones Act against the federal prohibition on
possession of a firearm by a felon, which expressly contains an element
that the possession be "in commerce or affecting commerce."12 6 The Mor-
rison Court similarly addressed a statute with "no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce."' 27
In recognizing the jurisdictional element in SORNA, Professor Yung
concedes that the federal government can regulate and criminalize certain
registry violations involving interstate travel. He asserts, however, that
Congress acted too broadly in SORNA by not requiring a closer relation-
ship between a person's failure to register and travel in interstate com-
merce. 12 8 In the portion of his article proposing ways to bring SORNA
within the Commerce Clause, he writes that Congress could modify the
statute "so the travel is explicitly linked with the failure to register."1 29
Specifically, he suggests that "Congress could mandate that a person be
subject to the provision of SORNA only insofar as travel between state lines
has resulted in a failure to register."13 0 He repeatedly cites as a constitu-
tional comparison to SORNA the Mann Act,13 1 which relates to the inter-
state transportation of prostitutes.' 3 2
Professor Yung's contention appears to misapprehend the evil at
which SORNA was aimed, namely the problem of recidivist sex offenders
moving about to evade the scrutiny that comes with registration and law
enforcement and community attention. Joseph Duncan, the sex offender
who kidnapped Shasta Groene and killed her family in Idaho, was regis-
tered in North Dakota. Just before departing on his horrific crime spree,
124. Yung, supra note 6, at 413.
125. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
126. Id. at 561-62.
127. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
128. See Yung, supra note 6, at 416-17 ("For SORNA, the offender's travel is
wholly unrelated to the mental state needed to fail to register.").
129. Id. at 423.
130. Id.
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006) (creating felony punishable up to ten years
imprisonment for anyone who "knowingly transports any individual in interstate or
foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with
intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so").
132. Id.
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he was arrested in Minnesota where he sexually molested a six-year-old
child on a playground. Under Professor Yung's reconstruction of SORNA,
an offender like Duncan might not be subject to arrest in advance of an-
other heinous crime even if his registration lapsed, unless it could be
proved that that he knowingly failed to register with the intent to travel to
other states.
Professor Yung's core contention appears to be that SORNA's prohi-
bition and exercise of authority under the Commerce Clause is overly
broad, only minimally related to interstate travel, and, therefore, an un-
constitutional exercise of federal Commerce Clause authority. In sum, he
believes that the movement of an unregistered sex offender across state
lines is not enough to satisfy federal jurisdiction unless it is directly tied to
the registry violation.1 3 3 Such a requirement would, however, be a dra-
matic departure from Supreme Court precedent and a tightening of the
standard for Commerce Clause jurisdiction over the movement of persons
or things in interstate commerce.
In Scarborough v. United States,13 4 the Supreme Court sustained a much
broader exercise of legislative jurisdiction in relation to the federal statute
barring felons from possessing firearms in or affecting interstate com-
merce.13 5 The petitioner in Scarborough was convicted of possessing fire-
arms that had traveled in interstate commerce before he was convicted of a
felony offense and thereby prohibited from possessing certain guns. He
argued that federal law could not bar felons from possessing firearms un-
less the firearms had traveled interstate after the petitioner became a
felon. The Supreme Court rejected the argument: "In this case, the his-
tory is unambiguous and the text consistent with it. Congress sought to
reach possession broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with com-
merce occurred."1 3 6 Indeed, the Court noted Congress's "intent to outlaw
possession [of firearms] without regard to movement" for those with fel-
ony convictions,13 7 but that the element requiring interstate movement of
the firearm was added as a gloss to provide the necessary nexus to the
Commerce Clause to render the statute constitutional.13 8
133. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 6, at 416 ("Thus, there is no strong connection
with interstate travel under SORNA as there is under the Mann Act.").
134. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
135. Id. at 577.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 574.
138. Id. at 575 ("It seems apparent from the foregoing [legislative history]
that the purpose of Title VII was to proscribe mere possession but that there was
some concern about the constitutionality of such a statute."); cf Deborah Jones
Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MicH. L. REv. 674, 718-19 (1995) ("Even if the Court reex-
amined Scarborough [after United States v. Lopez], however, it might find sufficient
grounds to distinguish Lopez. The history of federal gun control is lengthy and
convoluted; findings associated with a prior version of the felon provision might
persuade the Court that Congress acted constitutionally. Apart from any legislative
history, the Court might discover that gun possession by convicted felons impli-
cates national interests to a greater degree than do other types of gun possession.
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The statute under consideration in Scarborough and the resulting deci-
sion contrast starkly with the interstate commerce nexus in SORNA. Un-
like the federal felon-in-possession statute, which does not require both a
firearm and some interstate movement of the felon and/or his gun post-
conviction, the SORNA statute requires both a failure to register and inter-
state movement of the felon post-conviction. Despite these significantly
greater ties to interstate commerce, Professor Yung concludes that
SORNA represents a vast expansion of Commerce Clause power, such that
jurisdiction under that Clause would be "unending" if SORNA were
deemed constitutional.139
Professor Yung similarly faults SORNA's failure-to-register penalty for
federally convicted sex offenders, claiming that Section 2250(a)(2)(A)
lacks a constitutional basis. He argues that "[e]ven under the most liberal
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, it is difficult to imagine a persua-
sive government argument that all persons who were once under federal
control are potentially subject to a lifetime under that control."1 40 In a
related article, Professor Yung has argued that "a holding of Commerce
Clause authority based only upon a prior felony conviction would create a
flypaper theory of the Clause whereby any person who entered federal
jurisdiction for just a moment was committed to such jurisdiction for
life."141
These arguments, while interesting, run up against the reality that
federal district courts have repeatedly declined to review the failure-to-reg-
ister penalty for federal convicts under the Commerce Clause, claiming
that jurisdiction under the Clause is not implicated by Section
2250(a)(2)(A). 14 2 Although the jurisdictional authority for Section
2250 (a) (2) (A) may not be as clear as these district courts have concluded,
it is also not as indirectly linked to federal jurisdiction as Professor Yung
has asserted. As explained below,'4 3 SORNA requires federally convicted
sex offenders to register for the first time before they are released from
imprisonment in a Federal Bureau of Prisons institution.144 It would be
Former felons, for example, may be more likely than other gun-toting citizens to
participate in interstate crime networks or receive guns in violation of other fed-
eral gun control measures. Rationales of this nature might be developed to up-
hold the ban on gun ownership by felons.").
139. Yung, supra note 6, at 416.
140. Id. at 411.
141. Yung II, supra note 6, at 135.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 143, 146 (D. Me.
2009) (agreeing with "fellow district courts that the Commerce Clause is not impli-
cated in a prosecution under § 2250(a) (2) (A)"); United States v. Yelloweagle,
Crim. No. 08-cr-00364-WYD, 2008 WL 5378132, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2008)
(same); United States v. Santana, 584 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946-47 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
(same).
143. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b) (1) (2006) (setting forth initial registration require-
ment for sex offenders who are still completing federal sentence of
imprisonment).
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anomalous for the federal government to lack the authority to penalize a
failure to comply with the federal registration requirement imposed on a
federal inmate within a federal prison. Far from flypaper, the authority
more closely resembles the sorts of controls that are imposed on federal
convicts through conditions of supervised release. In challenging such a
justification of federal jurisdiction, Professor Yung cites the Fourth Circuit
decision that was overturned by the Supreme Court in United States v. Com-
stock1 45 last term. Comstock dealt with the federal authority to civilly com-
mit dangerous sex offenders charged with or convicted of federal sex
crimes.1 46 The Fourth Circuit held that Congress lacks the constitutional
authority to create a civil commitment mechanism for dangerous and un-
reformed sex offenders beyond the term of their federally imposed sen-
tence.14 7 In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit and held that Congress possessed the power to create such
a civil commitment authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.14 8
As discussed below, the Supreme Court's ruling helps clarify the jurisdic-
tional basis for Section 2250(a) (2) (A) by explaining the federal govern-
ment's need to exercise jurisdiction over certain potentially dangerous
federal inmates who would otherwise be discharged into communities that
are unaware of, and unprepared for, the inmates' arrival.' 49
Views similar to Professor Yung's were recently published in an article
by Anne Marie Atkinson. 15 0 Unlike Professor Yung, who appears to recog-
nize some authority by which Congress can regulate the interstate move-
ment of unregistered sex offenders, Ms. Atkinson takes a much narrower
view. She writes that,
[a] Ithough regulations on sex offenders who engage in interstate
travel are necessary, the determination of how and when to regu-
late should remain a decision for the states. . . . To leave this
power in the hands of Congress as a power given to them under
the Commerce Clause would be a gross deviation from the Fram-
ers' intentions.15 1
In the analysis portion of her article, she reviews federal court decisions
that affirm or reject the constitutionality of SORNA under the Commerce
Clause, criticizing the courts that have affirmed the Act's constitutionality
as having "essentially rubber-stamped SORNA's criminal provisions as con-
stitutional," and charging that they did "so by applying superficial inter-
pretations of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause."1 5 2
145. 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1949.
146. Yung, supra note 6, at 412.
147. Comstock, 551 F.Sd at 284-85.
148. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
149. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
150. Atkinson, supra note 6.
151. Id. at 600.
152. Id. at 587.
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Ms. Atkinson takes a much more friendly view of the courts and deci-
sions that agree with her position-as expressed in the title of her arti-
cle-that SORNA is an "unconstitutional infringement of States' rights
under the Commerce Clause."' In reviewing the minority of decisions
that reject SORNA's compliance with the Commerce Clause, she writes
that "these holdings have been reached through proper interpretation of
Congress's Commerce Clause power."15 4 In favorably analyzing the cases
rejecting SORNA's constitutionality, Ms. Atkinson writes:
Although the statute stands for a just cause, it has not been
proven that states are incapable of enforcing sex offender regis-
tration requirements without Congress's help. In fact, the court
[in United States v. Powers] found the opposite to be true because
each state has implemented its own registration requirements as
it sees fit.' 5 5
This part of Ms. Atkinson's analysis, however, conflicts directly with the
findings of federal district courts that have analyzed the issue.15 6 As one
of these courts explained, "SORNA is intended to accomplish something
the states themselves had not accomplished, and something that has a dis-
tinctly national character[;] "157 namely, "track[ing] registered sexual of-
fenders as they move from state to state."' 58
Ms. Atkinson's conclusion that individual state registries have not
proven ineffective also conflicts with the facts of the Groene case, dis-
cussed above, where a state court judge in Minnesota was unaware of the
full extent of Joseph Duncan's sex offense record when he granted
Duncan bail.' 5 9 Thejudge's lack of information appears to have been due
to gaps in sex offender registry information sharing between North Da-
kota and Minnesota. 6 0
In the conclusion of her article, Ms. Atkinson challenges the scope of
SORNA, asserting that the statute has an unprecedented reach. Specifi-
cally, she asserts that "SORNA merely requires that a convicted sex of-
fender travel to another state to face criminal charges." 16 ' This assertion,
153. Id. at 573.
154. Id. at 587.
155. Id. at 593.
156. See United States v. Van Buren, No. 3:08-CR-198, 2008 WL 3414012, at
*13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008), affd, 599 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 483 (2010) (explaining that SORNA was enacted to cure gaps in state-by-state
registry system to better track interstate movement of sex offenders); United States
v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D. R.I. 2008) ("SORNA is essentially an
effort by Congress to close the loopholes in previous sex offender registration leg-
islation and to standardize registration across the states.").
157. Van Buren, 2008 WL 3414012, at *15.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
161. Atkinson, supra note 6, at 600.
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however, exaggerates the reach of SORNA and plays upon the notion that
the Act somehow penalizes sex offenders in a per se manner. As ex-
plained below, SORNA's criminal provision requires both a knowing viola-
tion of federal law and travel in interstate commerce. Specifically, for any
person who has been convicted under a state sex offense law to violate
SORNA, he or she must: (1) be required to register under the tiered sys-
tem established under the Act; (2) knowingly fail to register; and (3)
thereafter travel in interstate commerce.16 2
VIII. CONGREss ACTED WITHIN ITS COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS IN
ENACTING THE ADAM WALSH ACT
Congress did not exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause,
but enacted a federal failure-to-register penalty that is narrowly confined
to sex offenders who move in interstate or foreign commerce or who were
convicted of crimes within federal jurisdiction. Although some courts and
critics have claimed the Act's registry and failure-to-register provisions ex-
ceed Congress's Commerce Clause powers,' 6 3 the text and history of the
statute show that Congress drafted the registry provisions in a way that
squares with long-standing Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Indeed,
even an otherwise harsh critic of the Act's registry provisions has conceded
that:
[Commerce Clause objections] appear to be misplaced, as almost
every court considering Commerce Clause challenges has held
SORNA to be an appropriate exercise of congressional authority.
Congress anticipated challenges to its Commerce Clause powers,
which is reflected in the fact that SORNA's criminal provision
contains a jurisdictional element that enables Congress to regu-
late interstate travel of sex offenders.16 4
In enacting the sex offender registry and failure-to-register provisions
of the Adam Walsh Act, Congress acted pursuant to the enumerated juris-
diction and powers granted in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, and
in particular the power " [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and
among the several States and with the Indian Tribes . . . ."165
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all aspects of Con-
gress's ability to legislate under the Commerce Clause. At issue here is
Congress's power to regulate the movement of persons and illegal activity
across State lines, which is well-established.' 66 Although there has been
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006).
163. See supra Parts VI-VII.
164. Jacob Frumkin, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 325-27 (2008).
165. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
166. See David M. Crowell, Gonzales v. Raich and the Development of Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence: Is the Necessary and Proper Clause the Perfect Drug?, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 251, 284 (2006) ("Lopez reaffirmed the federal government's authority under
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significant debate about Congress's power to regulate purely intrastate
conduct that substantially affects commerce,' 6 7 the Supreme Court has
long recognized Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as it re-
lates to interstate activity and the movement of persons across state
lines.' 6 8 For example, even as the Supreme Court sought to check a mis-
use of Commerce Clause jurisdiction in United States v. Lopez,169 it identi-
fied "three broad categories of activities Congress may regulate under its
commerce power," including the power "to regulate and protect the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities."' 7 0
Unlike Commerce Clause authority under the "effects test," this latter
category of federal legislative jurisdiction is well-established and largely un-
controversial. Courts have consistently affirmed the constitutionality of
the Commerce Clause to regulate persons or things moving in interstate
commerce.").
167. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1444 (1980) ("The commerce clause does not say 'Congress shall have
the power to regulate commerce, and all matters affecting commerce with foreign
nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."'); see also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the
Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities,
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and
political responsibility would become illusory.").
168. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me.,
520 U.S. 564, 573 (1997) (ruling that state tax law exemption violated dormant
Commerce Clause and noting that exemption at issue dealt with "the transporta-
tion of persons across state lines that has long been recognized as a form of 'com-
merce"'); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing three bases for Commerce Clause
authority, including that "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."); Brooks
v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1925) (affirming Congress's authority to
enact National Motor Vehicle Theft Act and stating, "Congress can certainly regu-
late interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such
commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any
evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. In doing this, it
is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field
of interstate commerce."); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (af-
firming Congress's authority to prohibit interstate travel in aid of prostitution and
explaining that "Congress has power over transportation 'among the several
states'" and that "Congress, as an incident to [such power], may adopt not only
means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the qual-
ity of police regulations."); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 325 (1903) (uphold-
ing Congress's authority to forbid interstate trafficking in lottery tickets and
writing that Court's rulings on Commerce Clause "show that commerce among the
states embraces . . . intercourse, . . . traffic, [and] the transit of persons. . . . They
also show that the power to regulate commerce among the several states is vested
in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government.").
169. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
170. Id. at 558.
76 [Vol. 56: p. 51
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss1/2
2011] THE ADAM WALSH ACT & THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
federal statutes that prohibit the illegal movement of persons and things
in interstate commerce. Such rulings have embraced bans on the inter-
state movement of prostitutes, 171 stolen vehicles,172 child pornography, 17 1
lottery tickets,174 forged securities,175 and stolen property. 176 When the
Supreme Court heard challenges to early civil rights legislation, the Court
cited Congress's clear and long-standing authority to regulate the move-
ment of persons in interstate commerce. In affirming Congress's author-
ity to ban discrimination in public accommodations in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,1 7 7 the Court traced the history of its Commerce
Clause case law and found that it was "settled as early as 1849" that "inter-
course" in commerce "included the movement of persons through more
States than one."1 78 Indeed, Congress's authority to regulate the move-
ment of persons is so well-established that a leading constitutional law trea-
tise dedicates an entire section to the subject.17 9
As discussed above, critics have attacked SORNA's constitutionality on
commerce grounds on two main fronts. The first argument, which in all
171. See Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323 (affirming Congress's power to regulate the
interstate movement of prostitutes).
172. See Brooks, 267 U.S. at 436-37 (affirming Congress's authority to enact
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act which banned interstate transport of stolen
vehicles).
173. See United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming chal-
lenge to defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) on commerce grounds,
explaining "[i]t is well-established that Congress can regulate activities that involve
interstate or international transportation of goods and people, regardless of
whether the transportation is for a 'commercial purpose'"), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
942.
174. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 325 (1903) (upholding Congress's
authority to outlaw interstate trafficking of lottery tickets).
175. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642 (1982) (rejecting defendant's
argument that federal prosecutor must prove that forgery itself occurred in inter-
state commerce rather than security, which was at some point forged, traveled
across state lines). In its McElroy decision, the Court reasoned:
Congress has sought to aid the States in their detection and punishment
of criminals who evade state authorities by using the channels of inter-
state commerce. Based on this congressional purpose, the trial judge in
the present case correctly instructed the jury that they could find the peti-
tioner guilty of violating § 2314 if they found that the forgeries occurred
during the course of interstate commerce, which includes a 'continuation
of a movement that began out of state,' even though movement of the
forged checks was restricted to one State.
Id. at 659.
176. See Russell v. United States, 119 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1941) ("There
can be no doubt of the power of Congress to make transportation in interstate
commerce of stolen articles a crime.").
177. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
178. Id. at 255-56.
179. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TRE-ATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw § 11.10, at 252 (4th ed. 2007) (stating in Treatise's sub-chapter "Com-
merce as Movement of Persons" that "[t]he judicial definition of commerce
includes the movement of persons").
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but one respect is easy to dismiss, is that SORNA's failure-to-register pen-
alty has an insufficient link to interstate commerce to permit federal legis-
lation. The second argument is more sophisticated and asserts that
SORNA's registry provisions exceed Congress's power to regulate com-
merce because those provisions-unlike the failure-to-register penalty-
do not contain a jurisdictional link to interstate commerce.
A. Section 2250(a) (2), the Commerce Clause, and the Movement
of Persons in Interstate Commerce
As discussed above, the federal failure-to-register penalty has alternate
jurisdictional elements, each of which implicates a different constitutional
basis for legislative jurisdiction.18 0 The first jurisdictional element deals
with sex offenders who were previously "convicted under Federal law (in-
cluding the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of the District of
Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or possession of the
United States."18 The second alternate jurisdictional element is very dif-
ferent, requiring either interstate or foreign travel, or travel or residence
in "Indian country."' 8 2 The former implicates more traditional areas of
exclusive or concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction, while the latter is
clearly an exercise of traditional Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Despite
the obvious differences between the two alternate jurisdictional elements,
critics tend to fault both provisions on Commerce Clause grounds.1 83
Taking the second element first, there is simply no merit to the argu-
ment that the Commerce Clause fails to provide legislative jurisdiction to
reach unregistered sex offenders who travel in interstate or foreign com-
merce. Notwithstanding the handful of rulings and law review articles that
fault Section 2250(a) (2) (B)'s constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, the reality is that the statute contains an express jurisdictional ele-
ment of the sort approved in case after case before the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts.'18 As Professor Lawrence Tribe writes in his
constitutional law treatise, this kind of statute-the sort "containing a ju-
risdictional element expressly requiring the trier of fact to find some sort
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2) (2006) (setting forth alternate jurisdictional
elements including one element to govern those who travel in interstate or foreign
commerce and one to govern those whose sex offense conviction was under fed-
eral law or within jurisdiction over which federal government has exclusive or con-
current criminal jurisdiction).
181. Id. § 2250(a) (2) (A).
182. Id. § 2250(a) (2) (B).
183. See Yung II, supra note 6, at 134 ("Each of these groups [under the two
elements of Section 2250(a)(2)] presents a slightly different legal question in re-
gard to the Commerce Clause.").
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2) (B) (including as element for federal failure-
to-register penalty that person "travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters
or leaves, or resides in, Indian country"); see also LAWRENCE H. TRiBE, 1 AMERICAN
CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW 829-30 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing line of cases approving
criminal statutes with jurisdictional elements that were left untouched by Lopez or
even cited approvingly by Court in that decision).
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of connection or link to interstate commerce"-was "left largely un-
touched" by the Supreme Court's Lopez decision.1 8 5 Similarly, the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison,'8 6 which invalidated a
civil remedy against sexual assault perpetrators on commerce grounds, did
not speak to a statute with a jurisdictional element tied to interstate com-
merce or travel.18 7 The statute at issue had no such element, 8 8 and the
lack of such an element was likely dispositive. The Morrison Court's major-
ity noted that a criminal penalty enacted within the Violence Against Wo-
men Act contained an express jurisdictional element very similar to that
contained in Section 2250(a)(2)(B).' 8 9 The Court noted that "[t]he
Courts of Appeals have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction as an ap-
propriate exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority."' 9 0 Accord-
ingly, the notion that Congress may regulate the interstate movement of
unregistered sex offenders appears to be well supported by the text of the
Constitution, the governing case law, and the legislative record, which is
described in more detail in Part IX below.
The next and thornier question is whether the failure-to-register pen-
alty can constitutionally be applied without a travel requirement to sex
offenders who were convicted under federal law or in a jurisdiction over
which the Constitution confers exclusive or concurrent federal criminal
jurisdiction. 19 As one critic of the Act has written, "[f]or a court to hold
that a conviction without interstate travel was a proper exercise of congres-
sional power would seemingly make the scope of the Commerce Clause
limitless."192 This criticism, of course, assumes that the failure-to-register
penalty for federal sex offenders relies upon the Commerce Clause for
185. TRIBE, supra note 184, at 829.
186. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
187. See id. at 613 ("Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez,§ 13981 contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of
action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Al-
though Lopez makes clear that such ajurisdictional element would lend support to
the argument that § 13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce, Congress
elected to cast § 13981's remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of
violent crime.").
188. Id.
189. Id. at 613 n.5 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1), which states, "[a] person
who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian country with the intent to
injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in
the course of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence
and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall be pun-
ished as provided in subsection (b)").
190. Id.
191. Cf Morse, supra note 6, at 1773 ("Section 2250 (a) (2) (A) is not a means
for the government to obtain information about sex offenders so that it can punish
them based on a jurisdictional hook, interstate movement; it is an end itself that
imposes criminal penalties on federal offenders who fail to register, despite the
fact that their crimes have no connection to interstate commerce.").
192. Yung II, supra note 6, at 134.
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legislative jurisdiction.1 os The federal courts that have addressed the con-
stitutionality of that provision have, however, repeatedly stated that the
first element in Section 2250(a) (2) does not rest on commerce jurisdic-
tion.194 Rather, those courts have held that Commerce Clause analysis is
wholly unnecessary because sex offenders under the first element were
convicted under federal law-whether the United States Code, Uniform
Code of Military Justice, or the law of some location over which the federal
government exercises territorial jurisdiction. 195
Regardless of the merits of the Commerce Clause arguments in oppo-
sition to Section 2250(a) (2) (A), there is nonetheless a degree of absurdity
in the claim that the federal government can create a nationwide sex of-
fender registry requirement, but then is without authority to penalize a
federal convict's failure to comply with that law. Indeed, the absurdity
becomes more extreme when one realizes that, under SORNA, a con-
victed sex offender must register before being released from prison.1 9 6
Therefore, sex offenders convicted under federal law are required to regis-
ter while in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.19 7 It would be
highly anomalous for Congress to lack the authority to punish registry vio-
lations in such circumstances.
The authority at issue in the registry context resembles the sorts of
controls that are imposed on released felons through conditions of super-
193. Cf United States v. Senogles, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1147 (D. Minn.
2008) (explaining how "the provisions of Section 2250 (a) (2) (A) do not raise Com-
merce Clause concerns, as they require that the defendant have a previous convic-
tion under Federal law").
194. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 143, 146 (D. Me.
2009) ("This Court agrees with its fellow district courts that the Commerce Clause
is not implicated in a prosecution under § 2250 (a) (2) (A)."); United States v. Yel-
loweagle, Crim. No. 08-cr-00364-WYD, 2008 WL 5378132, at *2-3 (D. Colo. Dec. 23,
2008) ("Like the other district courts that my research has revealed to have ad-
dressed the issue, I find that § 2250(a) (2) (A) raises no Commerce Clause implica-
tions. Furthermore, I find that Congress plainly has the authority to criminalize
the failure to register based on a prior federal sex offense conviction, and I find
that Congress does not need to provide any outside source of authority for this
legislation."); United States v. Santana, 584 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
("As state laws are not implicated, Congress' Commerce Clause authority, granting
Congress the power 'to regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among
the several States' does not represent the underlying principle through which Con-
gress drafted § 2250(a) (2) (A).").
195. See, e.g., Santana, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (denying defendant's motion to
dismiss indictment on Commerce Clause grounds because "defendants indicted
under § 2250 (a) (2) (A) are held accountable for violations of federal-not state-
law, which falls squarely within Congress' exclusive jurisdiction").
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b) (1) (2006) (requiring that sex offender's initial
registration, if incarcerated, shall occur "before completing a sentence of impris-
onment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement").
197. See id.; see also United States v. Van Buren, No. 3:08-CR-198, 2008 WL
3414012, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008) (describing process by which federal sex
offenders are advised of their obligation to register while still in federal custody),
aff'd, 599 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 483 (2010).
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vised release and related matters. Such controls have been affirmed as to
federal convicts even where the person is no longer in custody and where
the person has not traveled in interstate commerce. For example, in
United States v. Reynard,198 the Ninth Circuit affirmed Congress's authority
to require the collection of DNA samples from those who were previously
convicted under federal law.199 The Reynard court based its ruling on the
fact that, while every state had some form of DNA collection law within
their individual states, there was no similar authority for the collection of
DNA samples from those convicted of federal crimes. 200 Federal DNA col-
lection was required to supplement the state laws because the problem-
supporting a comprehensive DNA database-was one that defied a local
solution insofar as federal convicts might fall between the gaps in the
law.201 At least one federal district court has cited the Reynard decision to
uphold the constitutionality of an indictment charging Section
2250(a)(2)(A)'s penalty for federally convicted sex offenders.2 02 That
court concluded, "[w]hether directed to federal sexual offenders only, or
to all sexual offenders who travel in interstate commerce, SORNA does
not offend traditional notions of federalism because it addresses some-
thing each state does not have the power to accomplish-track registered
sexual offenders as they move from state to state." 203
The gap-filling need for federal regulation of federally convicted sex
offenders is brought home by the reality that federal sex offenders leave
federal custody in one state and are released in another jurisdiction where
they may or may not stay. As the Solicitor General recently explained in a
brief to the Supreme Court in a related matter involving federally con-
victed sex offenders:
[T] here can be no assurance that a State will be willing or able to
assume responsibility for a person upon his release from federal
prison-particularly a person with whom the State may have had
only limited connections and who might thus be likely to travel
to, and pose a threat to the public in, other States. 204
Had SORNA not created a federal registration requirement for federally
convicted sex offenders, a gap in the nationwide registry system would
have remained. Simply put, a federal penalty was needed to ensure regis-
try compliance by federally released inmates.
Congress's creation of such a penalty demonstrates its recognition
that the federal government has an interest in, and a responsibility for, sex
198. 473 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2007).
199. Id. at 1023-24.
200. Id. at 1023.
201. Id. at 1023-24.
202. Van Buren, 2008 WL 3414012, at *12-13.
203. Id. at *13.
204. Brief for the United States at 41, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
1949 (2010) (No. 08-1224).
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offenders who might quickly drift from federal custody to places where
detection and prosecution might be unlikely. After all, up to the time of
release, the federal government is the jurisdiction with custody of the of-
fender and full knowledge of his or her crimes and conduct while in cus-
tody. To this end, SORNA's criminal penalty for federally convicted
offenders who fail to register is merely recognition of the federal govern-
ment's responsibility for the safe release of inmates in its care. 20 5 As the
Supreme Court explained in dictum last term, "it is entirely reasonable for
Congress to have assigned the Federal Government a special role in ensur-
ing compliance with SORNA's registration requirements by federal sex of-
fenders-persons who typically would have spent time under federal
criminal supervision."2 0 6
Despite the authority and reasoning cited above, questions still re-
main about the extent of the federal government's power to regulate fed-
erally convicted sex offenders after their release. These questions appear
to be fading, however, with the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Comstock.207 In Comstock, the Court affirmed the federal govern-
ment's authority to civilly commit "mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal
prisoner [s] beyond the date the prisoner[s] would otherwise be released"
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 208 In so ruling, the Court relied
upon the federal government's role as custodian of inmates already in Bu-
reau of Prisons custody, reasoning that "as federal custodian, it has the
constitutional power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) commu-
nities from the danger federal prisoners may pose."209 Concurring in the
Court's judgment in Comstock, Justice Kennedy wrote: "Federal prisoners
often lack a single home state to take charge of them due to their lengthy
prison stays, so it is incumbent upon the National Government to act."2 10
The Comstock opinion and its supporting analysis lend strong support to
205. Cf id. at 42 (discussing "longstanding recognition that the federal gov-
ernment's relationship with federal prison inmates or those charged with federal
offenses creates interests and responsibilities that would not exist if they had not
come into federal custody" and that "some of those interests and responsibilities
should not terminate automatically at the close of a prison term").
206. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2238 (2010).
207. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
208. Id. at 1954.
209. Id. at 1961 ("If a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable dis-
ease that threatens others, surely it would be 'necessary and proper' for the Fed-
eral Government to take action, pursuant to its role as federal custodian, to refuse
(at least until the threat diminishes) to release that individual among the general
public, where he might infect others .... And if confinement of such an individ-
ual is a 'necessary and proper' thing to do, then how could it not be similarly
'necessary and proper' to confine an individual whose mental illness threatens
others to the same degree?" (citation omitted)).
210. Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the notion that Congress had a jurisdictional basis for enacting Section
2250 (a) (2) (A) under the Necessary and Proper Clause.2 11
B. Section 16913 as a "Necessary and Proper" Adjunct to Section 2250(a)
Critics claim the nationwide federal sex offender registry codified at
Section 16913 lacks any connection to commerce across jurisdictions.
This is misleading. Although Section 16913 requires sex offenders to reg-
ister in the state where they reside, it would be an oversimplification to say
that the registry provisions are purely intrastate or that they fail to focus on
sex offender movement. For example, the registry provisions require sex
offenders to register "in each jurisdiction" where the offender resides,
works, and studies. 212 The provisions also require sex offenders to appear
in person and update their registry information within three days of relo-
cating their residence, employment, or place of study.2 13 Other provisions
within SORNA contain information-sharing tools and requirements to en-
sure registry information is shared across jurisdictions, including for sex
offenders who enter the United States. 2 14
Nonetheless, if the above-described provisions did not exist, it would
admittedly be difficult to justify the type of nationwide federal sex of-
fender registry contained in Section 16913 in the absence of Section
2250(a)'s criminal penalty with its jurisdictional limits. Although argu-
ments could be advanced under Lopez's third-prong and the effects test, or
based on Congress's spending power due to funding triggers in SORNA,
neither argument would fully explain why Section 16913 needed to be
enacted in the Adam Walsh Act to address sex offenders' cross-jurisdiction
movement. A better argument-and one more in line with SORNA's
complete text and purpose-is that Section 16913 was "necessary and
proper for carrying into [elxecution"2 15 the federal failure-to-register pen-
alty codified at Section 2250(a).
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the power to
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
211. Despite the various arguments for and against the Commerce Clause ba-
sis for the failure-to-register penalty for federal sex offenders, the reality is that the
debate may prove to be largely academic. In the small number of reported cases
under Section 2250(a)(2)(A), many also involved charged violations of
2250(a) (2) (B), along with its interstate travel component. See, e.g., United States v.
Thompson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145-46 (D. Me. 2009). Accordingly, prosecutors
may be charging unregistered sex offenders with both prongs of the statute to
ensure that they can rely upon the portion of the statute with the strongest claim
to federal legislative jurisdiction if later challenged.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006).
213. Id. § 16913(c).
214. Id. §§ 16919, 16921(b), 16923, 16928.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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cution the foregoing Powers," 2 16 including the power to regulate com-
merce. 2 17 As one authority explains this Clause:
It authorizes what is "necessary to render effectual the particular
powers that are granted." Congress thus can make laws about
something otherwise outside the enumerated powers, insofar as
those laws are "necessary and proper" to effectuate federal policy
for something within an enumerated power. Although not inde-
pendently valid under another enumerated power, such laws are
supported by this clause to the extent that they constitute a
means by which federal policy can be executed under an enu-
merated power. 2 18
The federal registration requirement codified at Section 16913 falls
squarely into this category.
When Congress decided to create a federal failure-to-register penalty
to better regulate sex offenders who move across state lines,2 19 it had to
define in clear and enforceable language what "failure to register" actually
means. 220 Although Congress could theoretically have relied upon the
registry law existing in each state in 2006 and made such laws the federal
standard for registry violations, 22 1 the federal failure-to-register penalty
would have been tied to fifty disparate requirements, any one of which
could have flaws that could render federal enforcement impossible. More-
over, changes to those laws could create ambiguity as to the standard that
triggers a federal criminal violation. By the time the Adam Walsh Act was
passed, Congress had already been informed that disparate state registra-
tion requirements were creating compliance problems and contained gaps
through which at least 100,000 sex offenders had fallen. 222 As Ernie Al-
216. Id.
217. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
218. EDWIN MEESE III ET AL., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 147
(2005).
219. United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that "SORNA was enacted to keep track of sex offenders" across jurisdictions);
United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Thus, the statutory
scheme Congress created to enforce § 16913 demonstrates Congress was focused
on the interstate movement of sex offenders, not the intrastate activity of sex of-
fenders.") cert. denied, U.S. Ct. 2812.
220. See George, 625 F.3d at 1129 (stating that SORNA registration "require-
ments are clear and easy to understand" and noting that "[t]he government is
correct in that '[i]t is a reasonable construction of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 that the regis-
tration requirements mentioned should be found in 42 U.S.C. § 16913, the section
from SORNA entitled 'Registry requirements for sex offenders'").
221. Cf 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 195 (4th ed. 2007) ("However, Congress
can enact legislation prescribing that the federal pollution standard in each state
shall be the same as the state standard. Then, it is not abdicating its authority but
merely incorporating by reference future legislation.").
222. Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals:
What Needs to be Done?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 19
84 [Vol. 56: p. 51
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len, the President and CEO of the National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children, testified in June 2005:
A great deal of discretion is left to the States-appropriately-in
how they implement their registration programs. But the result
is that there is a significant lack of consistency and uniformity
from State to State. There are loopholes that permit sex offend-
ers to cross State lines and remain undetected. We know that
registered sex offenders often forum shop in order to achieve
anonymity. 22 3
Against such testimony, it was reasonable for Congress, in enacting a fed-
eral failure-to-register penalty for interstate violators, to view a uniform
national registration standard as a "necessary and proper" adjunct to that
penalty. 224 After all, how could the federal government effectively outlaw
the interstate movement of unregistered sex offenders from one state to
the next if the registration requirements in those states-or the triggers
for such registration-were all different?2 25
To evaluate the propriety of the federal registry requirement as a nec-
essary and proper component of the federal failure-to-register penalty, it is
helpful to look to the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich,2 2 6
and specifically to Justice Scalia's concurrence in that case. 227 In Raich,
the Supreme Court confronted the respondents' claim that the Federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) could not constitutionally be applied to
their personal-and, therefore, local-use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes, especially in light of California's enactment of the Compassion-
ate Use Act. 228 The Compassionate Use Act had exempted California phy-
sicians, patients, and primary caregivers from prosecution for the
possession or cultivation of "marijuana for the personal medical purposes
(2005) (statement of Ernie Allen, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children).
223. Id. at 14.
224. See United States v. Van Buren, No. 3:08-CR-198, 2008 WL 3414012, at
*14 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008) ("[T]he purpose of SORNA is to provide a compre-
hensive national system of registration of sex offenders-including a listing of the
offender's current residences, and the sharing of such information in order to
protect the public from these individuals. The registration and updating require-
ments of § 16913 are necessary to make § 2250(a)-a regulation of interstate com-
merce-effective."), aff'd, 599 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 483
(2010); see also 152 CONG. REC. S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Bill Frist) ("Loopholes in the current system allow some sexual predators to evade
law enforcement, placing our children at risk. While many States, including my
own home State of Tennessee, have registries, this information is not always shared
with other States. By creating a national registry, we are closing the loopholes that
allow offenders to slip through the cracks.").
225. See 152 CONG. REc. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch) (referring to "patch-work quilt" of varied state registry laws).
226. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
227. Id. at 33-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 5-8 (majority opinion).
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of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a
physician."2 29
The Court's majority, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, affirmed the
CSA's application to local cultivation and medicinal use of marijuana,
even where California law permitted such conduct. 230 The Court's opin-
ion rested on a broad Commerce Clause rationale that looked to whether
Congress could rationally conclude that such local activity could substan-
tially affect interstate commerce and undercut the federal regulation of
controlled substances. 2 3 '
Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's judgment, but did so on a
somewhat different legal ground,2 3 2 albeit one that was mentioned by the
Court's majority. 23 3 In particular, he explained Congress's authority to
regulate purely intrastate marijuana cultivation and medicinal use as a
necessary component of a broader regulation of interstate commerce. 234
In doing so, he explained how Congress is authorized under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to regulate intrastate activity if such regulation is both
essential and reasonably adapted to the broader regulation of interstate
commerce:
The regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a com-
prehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the
intrastate activity does not itself "substantially affect" interstate
229. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 2007).
230. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 31-33 (rejecting California exemption for pre-
scribed marijuana as "broad enough to allow even the most scrupulous doctor to
conclude that some recreational use would be therapeutic" and rejecting Califor-
nia's cultivation exception on same basis Supreme Court had affirmed federal reg-
ulation of locally cultivated and consumed wheat crops in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942)).
231. See id. at 22 ("Thus, as in Wickard [v. Filburn], when it enacted compre-
hensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Con-
gress was acting well within its authority to 'make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper' to 'regulate Commerce ... among the several States.' That the regu-
lation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done
many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger
scheme." (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8)).
232. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I write separately because my un-
derstanding of the doctrinal foundation on which that holding rests is, if not in-
consistent with that of the Court, at least more nuanced."); see also MEESE, supra
note 218, at 105 ("It would follow that Congress could regulate a local activity only
if its purpose comports with its delegated power to regulate commerce and the
regulation is plainly adapted to its interstate commerce purpose. So concluded
Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurrence in Gonzales v. Raich (2005), upholding
federal regulation of locally grown and consumed marijuana, otherwise legal
under state law.").
233. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (noting that Congress's regulation of local culti-
vation was "necessary and proper" adjunct to its Commerce Clause authority to
regulate marijuana trafficking generally).
234. See Crowell, supra note 166, at 296 ("Justice Scalia added that noneconomic
local activity could be regulated if necessary to a more general regulatory
scheme.").
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commerce.... Congress may regulate even noneconomic local
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general
regulation of interstate commerce. The relevant question is sim-
ply whether the means chosen are "reasonably adapted" to the
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.2 35
Citing a prior Supreme Court decision, Justice Scalia further explained
that "where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate
commerce, 'it possesses every power needed to make that regulation
effective.' "236
At least two federal Courts of Appeals have cited Justice Scalia's con-
currence in Raich as a basis for affirming the constitutionality of Section
16913 under the Necessary and Proper Clause.2 37 In a consolidated opin-
ion in United States v. Guzman,23 8 the Second Circuit reversed two lower
court rulings against the constitutionality of SORNA. After acknowledging
that "[t]he analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA's underlying regis-
tration requirement, § 16913, is more difficult" than the straightforward
analysis needed for the interstate failure-to-register penalty,2 3 9 the panel
looked to the Necessary and Proper Clause and Justice Scalia's concur-
rence cited above. 240 The Second Circuit then affirmed the constitution-
ality of Section 16913, reasoning that "[r]equiring sex offenders to update
their registrations due to intrastate changes of address or employment sta-
tus is a perfectly logical way to help ensure that states will more effectively
be able to track sex offenders when they do cross state lines."24 1
In United States v. Howell, the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclu-
sion in a consolidated ruling that affirmed the constitutionality of Section
16913 under the Necessary and Proper Clause.24 2 The Eighth Circuit's
analysis explains clearly why the nationwide registration requirement,
which reaches intrastate conduct, is necessary for the enforcement of the
interstate failure-to-register penalty:
When § 16913 is analyzed in relation to the purpose of SORNA,
it is evident § 16913 is an "appropriate aid[ ] to the accomplish-
ment" of tracking the interstate movement of sex offenders. The
requirements of § 16913 help establish a system by which the gov-
ernment can monitor the location and travels of sex offenders.
235. Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
236. Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110,
118-19 (1942)).
237. See United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence in Raich to affirm Congress's legislative jurisdiction to
enact Section 16913), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3487; United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d
709, 714-15 (8th Cir. 2009) (same), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2812.
238. 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
239. Id. at 90.
240. Id. at 91.
241. Id.
242. Howel4 552 F.3d at 716-17.
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Although § 16913 may reach a wholly intrastate sex offender for
registry information, § 16913 is a reasonable means to track
those offenders if they move across state lines. In order to moni-
tor the interstate movement of sex offenders, the government
must know both where the offender has moved and where the
offender originated. Without knowing an offender's initial loca-
tion, there is nothing to ensure the government would know if
the sex offender moved. The registration requirements are rea-
sonably adapted to the legitimate end of regulating "'persons or
things in interstate commerce"' and "'the use of the channels of
interstate commerce."' Covering the registration of wholly intra-
state sex offenders is merely incidental to Congress's tracking of
sex offenders in interstate commerce.2 4 3
Similar opinions have been issued by other Courts of Appeals af-
firming Section 16913 under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper
Clause.244 In sum, criticisms of Section 16913 on Commerce Clause
grounds miss the mark, albeit by only fifteen clauses in the
Constitution.2 4 5
IX. IN ENACTING THE ADAM WALSH ACT, CONGRESS MADE CLEAR ITS
DESIRE TO CREATE A UNIFORM SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY TO
ADDRESS THE UNREGISTERED MOVEMENT
OF SEX OFFENDERS
Throughout the text and legislative history of the Adam Walsh Act,
Congress made clear its intent to create a comprehensive nationwide regis-
try system to regulate the movement and activities of sex offenders across
jurisdictions and across state lines.246 Per the text of the Act, the criminal
243. Id. at 717 (citations omitted).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 2009)
(affirming constitutionality of SORNA's registration requirement under Necessary
and Proper Clause, writing "Section 16913 is reasonably adapted to the attainment
of a legitimate end under the commerce clause. The requirement that sex offend-
ers register under § 16913 is necessary to track those offenders who move from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.").
245. Justice Alito's concurrence in the recently-decided Constock case further
bolsters the application of Necessary and Proper jurisdiction to federal criminal
provisions like the registry requirements of Section 16913:
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides the constitutional authority
for most federal criminal statutes. In other words, most federal criminal
statutes rest upon a congressional judgment that, in order to execute one
or more of the powers conferred on Congress, it is necessary and proper
to criminalize certain conduct, and in order to do that it is obviously nec-
essary and proper to provide for the operation of a federal criminal jus-
tice system and a federal prison system.
United States v. Comstock, 130 U.S. 1949, 1969 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
246. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2) (B) (2006) (providing, as element of federal
failure-to-register offense, that person "travels in interstate or foreign commerce,
or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country"); 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006) (stat-
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prohibition on failure to register expressly applies to two categories of sex
offenders: (1) those who fail to register after moving in interstate or for-
eign commerce or in "Indian country";2 47 and (2) those who fail to regis-
ter after a federal conviction or a conviction otherwise within federal
military or territorial jurisdiction.248 The text of the Act does not purport
to create a broad federal criminal penalty that would reach purely intra-
state registry violations.249 Rather, the Act's basic text shows Congress's
focus on the interstate movement of unregistered sex offenders.2 5 0
Similarly, the House and Senate floor debates on the bill also exhib-
ited a focus on the undetected movement of sex offenders across state
lines. Namely, in the debates immediately preceding votes on the bill,
member after member cited the need to fill the gap in the then-existing
state-by-state registry system to prevent sex offenders from slipping
through the cracks in the system by relocation or interstate travel.2 5 1 Be-
low is a sample of the record that was developed during the debate and
passage of the Act.
Then-Senator Joseph Biden, a lead sponsor 252 of the Adam Walsh
Act, explained how the Act would prevent the undetected interstate move-
ment of convicted sex offenders:
ing purpose of SORNA registry provisions to be to establish "a comprehensive na-
tional system for the registration of [convicted sex] offenders"); Id. § 16913 ("A
sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction
where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the
offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender shall also
register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the jurisdic-
tion of residence." (emphases added)).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2) (B).
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2812. In Howell, the Eighth Circuit reasoned:
Under § 2250, Congress limited the enforcement of the registration re-
quirement to only those sex offenders who were either convicted of a
federal sex offense or who move in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(a) (2). With this limitation, a resident of Iowa who has been con-
victed of a state sex offense and who does not leave Iowa would never be
subject to federal sanctions if he fails to register. The Iowa resident could
only be punished under Iowa law for failure to register. A wholly intra-
state offender would never be reached by federal enforcement power.
This limitation demonstrates Congress's intention to punish only inter-
state offenders. Instead of creating a federal crime for failure to register
regardless of interstate movement, Congress understood its limited inter-
state commerce power and reserved prosecution of wholly intrastate of-
fenders to the states.
Id.
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a) (2) (B) (creating interstate travel element to fed-
eral failure-to-register offense for those not convicted under federal or tribal law).
251. See 152 CONG. REc. H5705-31 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (setting forth final
House debate on Act); 152 CONG. REc. S8012-31 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (contain-
ing closing Senate debate on Hatch amendment that became Adam Walsh Act).
252. The Senate amendment containing the final version of the Adam Walsh
Act was sponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch and cosponsored by Senators George
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One of the biggest problems in our current sex offender registry
system happens when registered sex offenders travel from one
State to another.
Delaware has worked hard to keep track of the 3,123 sex
offenders registered to my State. But there are other States that
are not so advanced and whose systems are not so sophisticated.
This bill fully integrates and expands the State systems so
that communities nationwide will be warned when high-risk of-
fenders come to live among them. And we target resources
under this bill at the worst of the worst and provide Federal dol-
lars to make sure States aren't left holding the bag.
We also require the U.S. Department of Justice to create
software to share with the States in order to allow for information
to be shared instantly and seamlessly among them. When a sex
offender moves from New Jersey to Delaware, for example, we
have to be absolutely sure that Delaware authorities know about
it.253
Senator Orrin Hatch, the Senator who introduced the amendment
that became the Adam Walsh Act, described the intended role of the Act's
national registry and penalty provisions:
It creates a National Sex Offender Registry with uniform stan-
dards for the registration of sex offenders, including a lifetime
registration requirement for the most serious offenders. This is
critical to sew together the patch-work quilt of 50 different State
attempts to identify and keep track of sex offenders.
Laws regarding registration for sex offenders have not been
consistent from State to State . . . . [N]ow all States will lock arms
and present a unified front in the battle to protect children.
Websites that have been weak in the past, due to weak laws and
haphazard updating and based on inaccurate information, will
now be accurate, updated and useful for finding sex
offenders. 254
Allen, Joseph Biden, Conrad Burns, Maria Cantwell, Norm Coleman, Mark Day-
ton, Mike DeWine, Byron Dorgan, John Ensign, Bill Frist, Chuck Grassley, Judd
Gregg, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Jon Kyl, Mel Martinez, Barbara Mikulski, Lisa
Murkowski, Bill Nelson, Harry Reid, Rick Santorum, Jeff Sessions, Olympia Snowe,
Arlen Specter, Jim Talent, and Craig Thomas. See Cosponsor List for S. Amdt. 4686 to
H.R. 4472, THOMAs, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d09:SP04686:
@@@P (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (listing cosponsors of bill).
253. 152 CONG. REc. S8014 (daily ed.July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Biden).
254. 152 CONG. REc. S8012-13 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
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Representative Earl Pomeroy, a House sponsor2 5 5 of the Act, gave the
example of Alfonso Rodriguez and his travel across state lines in describ-
ing the need for a uniform national sex offender registry. Rodriguez, a
convicted sex offender in the State of Minnesota, crossed into North Da-
kota to kidnap and kill University of North Dakota student Dru Sjodin.
The individual now on trial for her murder was a registered
sex offender, but only across the State line, which, in the context
of Grand Forks, North Dakota, is just across the river. So Alfonso
Rodriguez,... long incarcerated in the State of Minnesota, iden-
tified as a high risk sex offender within the State of Minnesota,
but unknown to those of us in North Dakota.
We need a national registry so we know where these high
risk predators are and we can find them . . . .
Another sponsor of the Act, Senator Maria Cantwell, described the
need to "close the gap between Federal and State sex offender registration
and notification programs" and cited the example ofJoseph Duncan, who,
though convicted of rape in Washington, was lost in the then-existing
patchwork of unconnected state registries.25 7 Senator Cantwell described
for the Senate how Duncan was left to commit heinous crimes against a
family in Idaho after being released by a Minnesota judge who was una-
ware of his past:
LastJune, the entire Nation was horrified by the kidnapping
and murders of the Groene family and the tragic crimes upon
little Shasta Groene.
Joseph Duncan was a convicted sex offender who beat
Brenda Groene; her 13-year-old son, Slade; and her boyfriend,
Mark McKenzie to death. Their bodies were found in their
home in Idaho on May 16, 2005. The killings captured the na-
tional headlines and prompted a massive search for the two
255. The House bill that was amended to create the Adam Walsh Act was
sponsored by Congressman James Sensenbrenner, Jr., and cosponsored by Repre-
sentatives Richard Baker, Leonard Boswell, Ginny Brown-Waite, Dan Burton, Ken
Calvert, Shelley Moore Capito, Ben Chandler, Robert (Bud) Cramer, Jr., Tom De-
Lay, Mark Foley, Randy Forbes, Elton Gallegly, Jim Gibbons, Paul Gillmor, Virgil
Goode, Jr., Sam Graves, Mark Green, Katherine Harris, Melissa Hart, Mark Ken-
nedy, John Kline, Thaddeus McCotter, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Dennis Moore,
Mike Pence, Ted Poe, Earl Pomeroy, Jon Porter, David Reichert, Thomas Reyn-
olds, Edward Royce, Pete Sessions, Christopher Smith, Lamar Smith, Curt Weldon,
Lynn Westmoreland, and Ed Whitfield. See Cosponsor List for H.R. 4472, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl09:HRO4472:@@@P (last visited
Mar. 6, 2011).
256. 152 CONC. REc. H5725 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Earl
Pomeroy).
257. 152 CONG. REc. S8019-20 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Maria Cantwell).
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Groene children, 8-year-old Shasta and her 9-year-old brother,
Dylan.
Six weeks later, on July 2, restaurant workers in Idaho recog-
nized Shasta and called the police. Dylan's remains were found
later in western Montana.
This did not have to happen.
In 1980, Duncan was convicted of rape in Washington State.
He was sentenced to 20 years in prison . . . . [H]e was released
on parole in 1994.
In 2000, he moved to Fargo, where he registered with the
North Dakota Sex Offender Registry, but before long he had
moved again and both the North Dakota and Washington State
registries lost track of him.
In April of 2005, a Minnesota judge released Duncan on bail
after he had been charged with child molestation. Duncan
promptly skipped town. Minnesota issued a warrant for his arrest
that May because he had not registered as a sex offender in that
State, but by that time it was too late. On May 16, the Groene
family was found dead and it wasn't until July 2 that Shasta was
recovered.
Joseph Duncan was essentially lost by three States. He
moved from State to State to avoid capture. No one knew where
he was nor even how to look for him.25 8
Then-Majority Leader Bill Frist amplified the statements of his fellow
Senators and bill sponsors:
Loopholes in the current system allow some sexual
predators to evade law enforcement, placing our children at risk.
While many States, including my own home State of Tennessee,
have registries, this information is not always shared with other
States. By creating a national registry, we are closing the loop-
holes that allow offenders to slip through the cracks.259
Senator Harry Reid, who was then the Senate's Minority Leader and a
cosponsor of the Act, spoke about the need for the Act and cited the
"problem when sex offenders cross State lines. The bill before us will es-
tablish uniform rules for the information sex offenders are required to
report and when they are required to report it. It will also give law en-
forcement agencies the tools they need to enforce these requirements." 260
258. Id.
259. 109 CONG. REc. S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bill
Frist).
260. 152 CONG. REc. S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Harry
Reid).
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A Senate Judiciary Committee report further attested to the Adam
Walsh Act's role in correcting gaps in the patchwork of state-by-state sex
offender registries. This report, entitled Activities Report of the Committee on
the judiciary, United States Senate, 2005-2006,261 explained how the National
Sex Offender Registry "provisions were designed to establish uniform stan-
dards for the registration of sex offenders, including a lifetime registration
requirement for the most serious offenders. Prior to the passage of the
Adam Walsh Act, a gap existed in the law governing how different states
track convicted sex offenders."2 62
The House Judiciary Committee held hearings prior to the passage of
the Adam Walsh Act and heard testimony from National Center for Miss-
ing and Exploited Children President and CEO, Ernie Allen, on June 9,
2005.263 At a hearing titled Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual
Predators and Violent Criminals: What Needs to be Done?, Mr. Allen described
in detail the gaps in the then-existing state-by-state registry system, includ-
ing the very real risk of undetected interstate travel by registered and unre-
gistered sex offenders:
Today, there are 550,000 registered sex offenders in the United
States, but at least 100,000 of those offenders are non-compli-
ant-literally, missing.
A great deal of discretion is left to the States-appropri-
ately-in how they implement their registration programs. But
the result is that there is a significant lack of consistency and uni-
formity from State to State. There are loopholes that permit sex
offenders to cross State lines and remain undetected. We know
that registered sex offenders often forum shop in order to
achieve anonymity.
Let me just cite a few examples of the discrepancies we be-
lieve exist. In eight States, the burden to notify authorities in the
new State to which the offender is moving is solely attached to
that offender. So only he has the obligation to tell the State to
which he's moving. In two States, neither the offender nor the
State authorities are required to notify authorities in the new
State. In another three States, this issue is not even addressed in
the law. 264
Prior to passage of the Adam Walsh Act, Congress considered various
proposals for updating the sex offender registry and notification program
to fill gaps in the state-by-state registration system. In 2005, the House
261. See S. REP. No. 109-369, at 16 (2007).
262. Id. at 16.
263. Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals:
What Needs to be Done?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Ernie Allen, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children).
264. Id. at 19-20.
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Judiciary Committee issued a report to accompany House Report 3132, the
Children's Safety Act of 2005.265 The report reflected the Committee's
concerns about the limitations in state registry systems that are exposed
through interstate travel by sex offenders:
The most significant enforcement issue in the sex offender
program is that over 100,000 sex offenders, or nearly one-fifth in
the Nation are "missing," meaning that they have not complied
with sex offender registration requirements. This typically occurs
when the sex offender moves from one State to another. When a
sex offender fails to register in a State in which he or she resides,
there is no effective system by which the States can notify each
other about the change in a sex offender's status. H.R. 3132 will
address this problem in several ways. 2 66
The strong record of the intent behind the Act does not stop with the
statements within the Congressional Record. In signing the bill into law,
President George W. Bush explained his Administration's understanding
of the intent behind the bill:
First, the bill I sign today will greatly expand the National Sex
Offender Registry by integrating the information in state sex of-
fender registry systems and ensuring that law enforcement has
access to the same information across the United States. It seems
to make sense, doesn't it? See, these improvements will help pre-
vent sex offenders from evading detection by moving from one
state to the next. Data drawn from this comprehensive registry
will also be made available to the public so parents have the in-
formation they need to protect their children from sex offenders
that might be in their neighborhoods. 2 67
X. CONCLUSION
Based on this record, it should be clear that Congress acted within its
enumerated powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses of the Constitution when it enacted the Adam Walsh Act and cre-
ated a uniform system to identify and register sex offenders nationwide.
As demonstrated by the text of the Act, the Congressional Record, Com-
mittee Reports, and hearing records, Congress acted to cure a gap in the
then-existing system to regulate and monitor convicted sex offenders and
prevent their undetected movement in interstate and foreign commerce.
The fact that members of Congress justified their support and sponsorship
265. H.R. REP. No. 109-218, at 26 (2005).
266. Id.
267. Press Release, The White House, President Signs H.R. 4472, the Adam
Walsh Act Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-
6.html.
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of the legislation by citing specific examples of sex predators who traveled
unregistered across state lines to commit offenses further shows that Con-
gress was focused on the interstate movement (i.e., commerce) of sex of-
fenders when the Adam Walsh Act was enacted. Recent academic articles
and court decisions claiming that the Adam Walsh Act's SORNA provi-
sions lack a constitutional foundation appear to turn a blind eye to this
record. The Act's text and legislative record establish the constitutionality
of the registry provisions. Perhaps this is why federal courts have begun
overwhelmingly to affirm SORNA's constitutionality under the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses. One can only hope that future courts
will follow this trend in the case law and recognize the plainly interstate
nature of the problem SORNA was designed to address.
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